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CALL AND RESPONSE: THE
PARTICULAR AND THE GENERAL
John A. Scanlan*
I. PRELUDE
A. A Personal Experience
The year is 1980. The setting is Liberty City, on the western edge of
downtown Miami, a few blocks from the Orange Bowl. A few months
later, flames ignited by the worst race riot in the city's history will singe
the palm trees and storefronts flanking the street where I walk.' I enter a
building with concrete walls. My host from the INS greets me and ushers
me up a flight of stairs.
Hundreds of Cuban and Haitian "boat people" are standing in long
lines in the center of a large, open hall. At one end, in small but comfort-
able glassed-in offices, the INS is conducting asylum interviews of re-
cently arrived Cubans. I am invited to observe the interview of a coffee-
colored, elderly man. The immigration officer asks him to explain why he
had left Cuba. A translator transmits the question and his answer. "I
want to join my children and grandchildren in the U.S.," he says. Pressed
to say more, he explains that he is growing old, that it is difficult to find
work in Cuba, and that he wants to join his children and grandchildren.
As we leave the office, my host explains that the man's motives for de-
parting Cuba are political, that he had clearly suffered "persecution,"
and is eligible for asylum.
At the other end of the hall, off a corridor, the INS is interviewing
Haitians. I am ushered into a room slightly larger than a broom closet. It
is windowless, furnished with a metal table, several metal chairs, perhaps
a metal filing cabinet. A beautiful dark black woman, probably still in her
teens, sits in one of the chairs, cradling a baby. Asked why she left Haiti,
she replies, in a voice that renders translation superfluous, "Le mis~re, le
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mishre." As we leave, my host explains that she is "clearly an economic
migrant."
B. A Historical Account
The Irish who emigrated to America in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth century were fleeing caste oppression and a system of land-
lordism that made the material conditions of the Irish peasant com-
parable to those of an American slave. They came to a society in
which color was important in determining social position. It was not
a pattern they were familiar with and they bore no responsibility for
it; nevertheless, they adapted to it in short order.... The outcome
was not the result of blind historical forces, still less of biology, but
the result of choices made, by the Irish, and others, from among
available alternatives. To enter the white race was a strategy to se-
cure an advantage in a competitive society.
The first Congress of the United States voted in 1790 that only
"white" persons could be naturalized as citizens. Coming as immi-
grants rather than as captives or hostages undoubtedly affected the
potential racial status of the Irish in America, but it did not settle
the issue, since it was by no means obvious who was "white."2
II. FRAMING THE CALL
A. Author
In a recently published article, Kevin Johnson has "identif[ied him-
self] as a Latino, specifically a Mexican-American or Chicano."3 Self-
identification is an important part of his story. One side of his family is,
as he puts it, "Anglo;" the other side, "Mexican-American.' 4 His Mexi-
can American mother and grandmother raised him in an English-
speaking, assimilation-oriented household.' Although the process of self-
identification was for many years unconscious- and always influenced
by familial circumstances- he characterizes it ultimately as a "choice":
For the most part, I was never forced to present myself as Mexican-
American. Although it may be difficult for some Latinos to "pass"
as White due to phenotype, surname, language skills, or accent, I
could, if I chose. I might have ignored my background and hoped
that nobody would remember, find out, or care, although to do so I
would have had to deny a family history that grew increasingly cen-
tral to my identity over my lifetime. Exemplifying the volitional na-
2. NOEL IGNATIEV. How THE IRISH BECAME WHITE 59 (1995).
3. Kevin R. Johnson, "Melting Pot" or "Ring of Fire"? Assimilation and the Mexican-American
Experience, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 173,177-78 (1998).
4. Id. at 178.
5. See id. at 180, 186.
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ture of racial identity, my brother, with sandy blond hair and blue
eyes, exercised his right to choose in a different way. He never iden-
tified as Mexican-American.6
B. Race and Racism
Johnson's identification with the Mexican American side of his
background is, in one sense, not unusual. Many Americans choose to
identify with the heritage of a particular parent or grandparent, to label
themselves Anglo American or Irish American or Polish American. But
Johnson uses the word "Mexican" in the phrase "Mexican-American" to
convey more than simple ethnic identity. In his view, to identify as Mexi-
can American is to choose not "to 'pass' as White."7 And to be identified
by others as Mexican American is to be the object of various forms of in-
tolerance and discrimination, ranging from bigoted bar-room jokes8 to
government programs intended to minimize Mexican immigration.9
"Mexican" is thus a racial term, something that stands in contrast to an-
other racial term, "Whiteness." To identify with one's Mexican ancestry,
Johnson argues, is to identify with the forgotten, ° the oppressed.
As the title of the article appearing in this issue indicates- and as
virtually all of Kevin Johnson's work over the last decade or so reveals-
this process of identification promotes inquiry into "race matters" of
every sort: the meanings of "race" and "racism;" their manifestations in
6. Id. at 179-80.
7. Id. at 180.
8. One such joke is as follows:
In the spring of 1996, I was sitting in a bar... in... California.... [A] tall fellow sitting on the
barstool next to us talked ... about a recent trip to Texas.... For whatever reason, I tuned into
one particular joke, which went something like this: "How do you make sure that nobody steals
the stereo speakers in your car." Without waiting for a response, he eagerly offered the punch
line: "You put a sign on them saying 'no habla espanol.'
Id. at 176.
9. In his writings, Johnson offers a number of examples. One is California's Proposition 187,
approved on November 8, 1994, and codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48,215(a) (West Supp. 2000),
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130(a), and CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10,001.5. See Kevin R.
Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A "Magic Mirror" into the Heart
of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1144 (1998) [hereinafter Johnson, Heart of Darkness] ("Race played a
prominent role in the passage of California's Proposition 187, one of the racial milestones of the
1990s.... Television advertisements emphasizing [Gov. Pete] Wilson's unqualified support for Propo-
sition 187 showed shadowy Mexicans crossing the borders in large numbers. Supporters blamed un-
documented Mexicans for California's economic woes .... "). See generally Kevin R. Johnson, An Es-
say on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and California's Proposition 187: The Political
Relevance and Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV. 629 (1995) (discussing the effect of immigration
politics on the passage of Proposition 187).
Other examples include the "repatriation" of "Mexican immigrants as well as citizens of Mexican
ancestry" during the Great Depression, id. at 1136, and the recruitment and subsequent treatment of
"an estimated one million Mexican workers who were temporarily admitted into the country to work
in agriculture" in the 1940s and 1950s, id.
10. Cf. Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of Nonciti-
zens, and Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1139, 1139 n.* (1993) ("Los Olvi-
dados, The Forgotten, is the title of a 1950 film by Spanish filmmaker Luis Bufhuel about impoverished
children living on the streets of Mexico City.").
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private and public life; the ways that racial attitudes and related actions
affect public policy and law; and the ways that those attitudes and poli-
cies might be countered or changed. In many respects, his project is
nearly identical to that of the critical race theorists and scholars with
whom he identifies and whose method and work he hopes to advance.
Several similarities stand out. I lay them out here but reserve sus-
tained comment on the underlying assumptions or theories, and the body
of scholarship supporting them, until after I have described the "call"
Johnson is making and my initial reactions to it.
First, Johnson resists formal definitions of "race," arguing instead
that there is nothing essential or biological about the term. Rather, two
radically different sources give it meaning: the dominant group in its con-
scious and unconscious attempt to justify privilege by seizing on superfi-
cial differences and treating them as essential; and the internalization of
subordinate status by those who have been dominated." "Racism,"
within this framework, is "socially constructed;"12 it exists primarily as a
set of psychological "facts," discursive practices,1' and social attitudes
that often are not fully understood or "intended" by those who display
them. For this reason, "racist" laws and policies need not be fully under-
stood or explicitly intended as such by those who promulgate them; it is
enough that they arise out of, support, and help perpetuate an unjustifi-
able system of domination and subordination. 4
11. See Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship, Law in the
Ivory Tower, and the Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 525,528 n.10.
12. See id. at 554 n.150 (collecting multiple sources in support of the general proposition "that
race is a social construction"); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Restrictions on Naturalization: The
Recurring Intersection of Race and Gender in Immigration and Citizenship Law, 11 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 142, 145,148-49 (1996) (reviewing IAN HANEY LbPEZ, WHrrE BY LAW (1996)).
13. I believe that Professor Johnson's focus on the ways that scholars present arguments and his
concern that "mainstream" scholars pay too little attention to race are both tied to a sense that racism
largely has "gone underground," that it employs a "neutral" vocabulary to procure repressive ends. It,
therefore, becomes necessary to explore silences, euphemisms, and rhetorical excess for their hidden
meanings. For more overt expression of this point of view, see Ian F. Haney L~pez, Race, Ethnicity,
Erasure: The Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 57 (1998). In particular, Professor
L6pez explains:
[T]he elimination of race as a language for understanding.., should be avoided. Put differently,
this Essay objects to the Court's evasion of race in Hernandez [v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954),]
even as it applauds the result in that case. It does so not because in the individual case one cannot
fully engage the social reality of race without using a social vocabulary; as Hernandez demon-
strates, with care one can largely do so. Rather, the objection is rooted in the firm sense that the
general abandonment of racial language and its replacement with substitute vocabularies, in par-
ticular that of ethnicity, will obfuscate key aspects of Latino/a lives.
Id. at 67.
14. Of course, Johnson believes that "[flactors that appear racially neutral... may mask legally
impermissible racial motives." Johnson, supra note 11, at 534. Johnson opines further:
The modern immigration debate often is racially polarized. Unlike the old Chinese exclusion
laws, however, the modern immigration laws for the most part are facially race-neutral. Despite
the facade of neutrality, these laws have unmistakably disparate impacts on immigrants of color
from developing nations.
Id. at 532 (emphasis added). Clearly, Johnson believes that immigration law scholars can and should
seek to pierce that facade, that cost arguments and other supposedly neutral "arguments for restric-
[Vol. 2000
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Second, Johnson shares the belief of other critical race theorists and
scholars that storytelling, particularly of a highly personal or autobio-
graphical cast, can illuminate the situation of those who are dominated
and cast into sharp relief the realities of racism and discrimination that
traditional legal scholarship usually ignores. 5
Third, Johnson and other critical race theorists and scholars believe
that history casts a persistent shadow; that racism directed at blacks,
Asians, and Hispanics is an old phenomenon; and that by exploring its
sources, development, manifestations, and influence in the past, we can
achieve a clearer vision of the present- and perhaps some insight into
the future.
C. Focus
As already demonstrated, Kevin Johnson's other work at times has
focused on the personal dimensions of race and racism. More often, it
has focused on the legal and political dimensions and looked directly at
such historical instances of racial subordination as the Chinese exclusion
laws or the Bracero programs of the 1940s and 1950s16 or at contempo-
rary statutes such as California's Proposition 187,17 the Immigration
Amendments of 1965,8 the Welfare Reform Act of 1996,19 or the North
American Free Trade Agreement.' °
tionist measures" often are susceptible to analysis that reveals the actual discriminatory intentions of
those making them. Id. at 534.
Yet in much of his work, Johnson argues explicitly or implicitly that "intent" need not be overt. As
he put it in his Indiana Law Journal piece, "[s]ubordination of Asian immigrants and the use of quotas
to exclude racialized peoples, among other devices, evolved into more subtle forms of exclusion with
the transformation of racial sensibilities in modem times." Johnson, Heart of Darkness, supra note 9,
at 1115-16.
15. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 3. Professor Johnson writes:
To analyze some difficult but crucially important issues for Latinos in the United States today, I
plan to borrow from my mother's experiences. Though aware of the alleged deficiencies of the
use of autobiography in legal scholarship, I write this hoping to bring to the fore the stories of
some Latinos who have been invisible or ignored, and to offer more general insights based on
those experiences.
Id. at 178; see also id. at 177 ("[The bar-room] story shows how a few words may hurt and marginalize.
It also, I thought, demonstrates the limits of assimilation for Latinos, even those who are half-White
and look the part."); id at 179 ("My experiences exemplify how, because race is a social construction,
people - at least some - decide to be Latino."); id. at 180 ("My family history exemplifies Latino het-
erogeneity."); id. at 181-82 ("Some of my experiences exemplify the difficulties of forcing people into
hard-and-fast categories, which law and society inevitably attempt to do."). Johnson also explains that:
The stories of my mother and grandmother reflect the difficulties of assimilation for Latinas.
Moreover, they serve as sad metaphors for the story of assimilation of Mexican-Americans in the
Southwest. My experiences reflect the amorphousness of the concept of race, the difficulties re-
sulting from racial uncertainty, and the complexities of racial mixture in a time of identity politics.
Id. at 182-83.
16. See supra note 9.
17. See 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 187 (West) (codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48,215(a) (West
Supp. 2000); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130(a); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10,001.5).
18. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1188 (1994)). Subsequent amendments have made additional changes in the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA). As amended, the INA substitutes a worldwide "ceiling" on legal immigration
No. 21
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Johnson's latest article looks instead at the ways that individuals
with a particular disciplinary and institutional background deal with is-
sues of race and racism. Indeed, it is addressed directly to them. Thus,
the article deals with its subject at one remove. It focuses on the scholarly
practices of legal academics who write about immigration law.
D. Audience
Kevin Johnson speaks to "two distinct audiences."2 He challenges
"minority scholars engaging in [critical legal scholarship]" to "unravel the
intricacies of legal doctrine and the racial discrimination that it ob-
scures."22 His critique is broad enough to implicate the publishing prac-
for the old "national origins quota" (NOQ). 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1152 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The NOQ
established differential quotas for every country in the world. Those quotas were keyed to the per-
centage of American citizens claiming a particular national origin. See Act of Oct. 3, 1965, § 3, 79 Stat.
at 913. The quotas were also skewed to minimize the number of visas available to Asians and to peo-
ple still subject to colonial rule- including virtually all Africans. The system applied only to countries
in the "eastern hemisphere," although nonquantitative rules adversely affected the migration of those
considered "undesirable" who hailed from the Caribbean and Latin America. See id. The system
awarded the great majority of visas to natives of only three nations: England, Germany, and Ireland.
As amended, the INA makes immigration available in three broad categories: to migrants entering
the United States on the basis of close family relationships to U.S. citizens or "permanent residents,"
see 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) ("family-sponsored" immigrants); to those with particularly desirable job skills
or substantial capital to invest, creating jobs in the United States, see 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) ("employ-
ment-based" immigrants); and to so-called diversity or lottery migrants, whose visa eligibility is prem-
ised on the notion that the countries they hail from have been "underrepresented" in the allocation of
visas in recent years, see 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c). The principal intended beneficiaries of the "diversity" visa
program have been migrants from Ireland. See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race
Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 74 n.234 (1998) (stat-
ing that the program was designed to favor Ireland and other northern European countries) (citing
Legal Immigration Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and Int'l
Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 7 (1998)). Under the present system, a maxi-
mum of approximately 25,000 visas in a particular year are made available to applicants from any par-
ticular country. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1152. Year after year, a few countries "oversubscribe" their quo-
tas by large margins. These include, inter alia, the Philippines, Mexico, the People's Republic of China,
the Dominican Republic, India, and Korea. See, e.g., BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, Immigrant Numbers for March 2000,8 VISA BULL. No. 16, Mar. 2000, $ 4 (establishing special
cut-off dates "for a foreign state or dependent area when visa demand exceeds the per-country limit[,
which] apply at present to the following oversubscribed chargeability areas: INDIA, MEXICO, and
PHILLIPINES").
In the instant piece, Professor Johnson quotes with approval an article criticizing the 1965 amend-
ments and their successors, because the "per country limits ... and the 'diversity' visa program" have,
in Johnson's words, "unmistakably disparate impacts on immigrants of color from developing na-
tions." Johnson, supra note 11, at 532.
19. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105. Professor Johnson discusses this statute briefly in his article appearing in this issue.
See Johnson, supra note 11, at 533.
20. The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 296
(1993). For Johnson's discussion of this treaty, the treaty's failure to open U.S. borders to Mexican
migrants, and the treaty's relationship to the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo [Treaty of Peace,
Friendship, Limits and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, Feb. 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., 9 Stat. 922],
see generally Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration, Citizenship, and USJMexico Relations:
The Tale of Two Treaties, 5 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 121 (1998).
21. Johnson, supra note 11, at 527.
22. Id. To do so, "[tihey must confront the traditionalists in the conventional immigration venues
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tices of leading law reviews, intent on publishing well-established, "impe-
rial" scholars.23 Yet the second group he explicitly addresses are "main-
stream immigration scholars focused on legal doctrine. 24
"Mainstream" scholars are Johnson's principal target. Clearly in-
cluded in this group are the editors of the two leading immigration case-
books and a number of scholars named in the footnotes. Otherwise,
however, his description of his "mainstream" audience is imprecise. I be-
lieve that Johnson intends to include all scholars, "White" or minority,
who tend to ignore issues of race and racism in their writings. He also
may intend to include scholars who do address those issues at least occa-
sionally but usually do so without making direct reference to critical race
scholarship or theory. However, his use of the term "ivory tower" and his
explicit reference to "scholars focused on doctrine" generate significant
uncertainty. For, as I will argue below, many of the scholars who have
paid little or no heed to critical race scholarship or theory have listened
to the stories of migrants they have chosen to represent and have con-
fronted the injustices of contemporary immigration law with weapons
that include- but are hardly limited to- doctrinal arguments.
E. Description and Proscriptive Norms
Kevin Johnson's article gives its readers a very quick overview of
the scholarship it is promoting and the scholars it is evaluating. Rather
than exhaustively describing the work of Critical Race Theory and schol-
arship or "mainstream immigration scholarship," it makes a fairly gen-
eral claim that there are "two separate legal discourses on immigration-
an 'ivory tower' perspective focusing on doctrine and race scholarship"'
and that they are, metaphorically speaking, "ships passing in the night."26
The article seeks to bring these ships within hailing distance of each
other and to permit the passengers on each to exchange opinions. Yet
the piece's overall tone is proscriptive, rather than permissive. Critical
race scholars are told that they should pay more heed to doctrine and en-
ter more mainstream "venues" to promulgate their ideas. "Mainstream"
scholars, however, are issued a more demanding challenge or call.
and initiate a true race and immigration dialogue." Id.
23. Following the lead of Stephen Shie-Wei Fan, Note, Immigration Law and the Promise of
Critical Race Theory: Opening the Academy to the Voikes of Aliens and Immigrants, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 1202, 1228 (1997), Professor Johnson consciously deploys the term "imperial scholar," initially
coined by Richard Delgado. See Johnson, supra note 11, at 527. As used by Delgado, the term de-
scribed a self-perpetuating scholarly elite, incestuously cross-referencing each other, promoting each
other's work, and dominating the pages of the so-called top law reviews. See Richard Delgado, The
Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 573
(1984); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outside Writing, Ten
Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1350 (1992).
24. Johnson, supra note 11, at 527.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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III. THE CALL
Professor Johnson contends "that mainstream immigration law
scholarship fails to confront squarely the reality of the influence of
race."27 He hopes to convince those who practice such scholarship to do
three things: confront that reality; "consider racial critiques of the law,
including Critical Race Theory, Critical Latina/o Theory, and Asian
American legal scholarship;"' and accept the "daunting challenge of en-
suring the removal of racial discrimination's taint on the development of
immigration law and policy." 9 Johnson clearly believes that these tasks
are so closely interrelated that they may, in fact, be inseparable. Thus, he
strongly implies that it is impossible to confront the reality of race in
America without employing concepts borrowed from "critical" scholar-
ship and committing oneself to the eradication of every trace of racism in
immigration policy and law. To those scholars who believe that "race is
not a significant factor in the formulation of modern immigration law
and policymaking and that the race scholarship overstates the influence
of race"30 and to those who argue that "doctrine is neutral, and the race
scholars have failed to make the case that race factors into the analy-
sis,"31 Johnson lays down a direct challenge: "One... might hope that
those who hold these views would explain and defend them rather than
wholly ignore the racial critique of immigration law and policy."3"
IV. FRAMING THE RESPONSE
A. Author
I am an Irish American Catholic, "white" by any definition cur-
rently in vogue. As best I can tell, each of my ancestors migrated to the
United States from Ireland directly or by way of Canada. All arrived in
the New World during the nineteenth century; the earliest probably in
the 1820s, the latest about 1880. My father grew up in a small, predomi-
nantly Irish Catholic, working-class neighborhood in Milwaukee, sur-
rounded by German Americans and Polish Americans. My mother grew
up in considerably more glitzy surroundings, first in Catholic St. Paul and
later on Milwaukee's more ecumenical North Shore. Neither of my par-
ents encountered many blacks, Latinos, or Asians when they were chil-
dren. Those they did encounter almost certainly were employed in me-
nial jobs- as gardeners, maids, railroad porters, parking lot attendants,
and the like. I am certain that both my parents were raised in an atmos-
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 526.
30. Id. at 552-53.
31. Id. at 553.
32. Id.
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phere of casual racism. I vividly remember standing next to my maternal
grandfather, Thomas McCormick, waiting for his car on a rain-slicked
street and watching the black attendant wheel his Buick down the ramp
of the parking garage with amazing speed. I remember that my grandfa-
ther called him "boy" and tipped him a quarter.
I admired and loved my grandfather immensely. He had raised four
daughters and a niece but never a son. I was his first grandchild, the son
he had never had. Until I was thirteen or so, I spent each summer and
each Christmas with him and my grandmother. Twice, I spent entire
school years with them.
My parents were not happily married. My father was a professional
actor, an immensely talented man haunted by demons. In 1954, he won a
New York drama critic's award for the best performance off-Broadway
that year. A decade later, Doubleday published his first novel. A promi-
nent New York gallery gave his drawings in pen and ink a show. He
wrote plays, delivered wickedly funny impressions of famous actors, and
always had a story to tell, usually about himself. He read novels by Dick-
ens and plays by Ibsen aloud to his two oldest children- my sister Brigid
and myself-doing each character in a different voice. Hedda Gabler
sounded something like Marlene Dietrich. He also drank heavily, strug-
gled with his sexual identity, made enemies, lost job after job, and was
effectively blacklisted by some of the best directors in New York. His
experiences in the Army and later in the theater had made him a liberal,
racially aware and tolerant. He voted Democrat.
My mother was raised a Republican and remained one her entire
life. Her great act of rebellion was marrying my father. She paid for it. As
a teenager, she finished second in a national short story writing contest.
She had the quickest mind of anyone I ever met. Yet she taught as a sub-
stitute teacher for years in some of the worst schools in New York so that
she could put bread and milk and peanut butter and Kraft macaroni and
cheese on the table. She loved to shop at thrift stores. Later, after we
moved to an all-white suburb in New Jersey, she found a permanent
teaching position. When she died three years ago, she left a substantial
nest egg to her four children, almost all saved up from forty years of
public school teaching. However much she sought to establish her inde-
pendence from her father, in the end she bought into his Horatio Alger
philosophy.
To one of my mother's sisters I owe the insight that my beloved
grandfather was Horatio Alger, that it was that sort of mythic life he led.
One of thirteen children, the son of immigrant parents, fatherless at an
early age, he served as principal support for his family while working his
way, first through private high school, then college, then medical school.
He held down multiple jobs, lighting the street lamps before the sun
came up, delivering papers and groceries, shoveling coal, and working
one summer as a lifeguard hoping that no one would call for help be-
No. 21
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cause he had never learned to swim. He believed that his success was due
to hard work. And of course it was. But it probably never occurred to
him that the lamp lighting job, the delivery jobs, and the lifeguard job
were opportunities available to Irish kids growing up on the south side of
Milwaukee but not to the few black families who had migrated to that
city before the Great Depression and were struggling to make a living
there. Their poverty, in his eyes, was a "natural" fact, something attribut-
able to skin color, laziness, and genes and not to segregation and lack of
opportunity.
Privilege comes in many flavors. For years I identified exclusively
with my mother's side of the family, the more abstemious and conven-
tional side, the side that seemed more ambitious and more successful. I
shuttled between the white suburbs of Milwaukee and the racially mixed
neighborhood of Morningside Heights in Manhattan-and I much pre-
ferred the suburbs. As an eleven- or twelve-year-old child, I journeyed
alone through New York City to get allergy shots. Every other Saturday,
I walked down a long flight of steps into Harlem, crossed Morningside
Park, and caught the downtown subway. An hour or so later, I repeated
the journey in reverse. Most of the people I encountered along the way
were black or brown. Almost always, they were friendly, often helpful.
No one ever threatened, hurt, or hassled me. Yet I was almost always
afraid.
No single event converted me from a young Republican to a liberal,
perhaps even radical, Democrat. My awareness of race and its relation-
ship to privilege was gradual, not sudden. I do not claim that even now
the conversion has been total. Unlike Saul, I was not struck down by a
single flash of lightning. Instead, events accumulated. Those I name were
memorable, but they constituted only a fraction of the experiences that
helped reshape me. In rough chronological order, they included:
- attending professional baseball games with my grandfather, in a
stadium filled with fans of every color, watching black and Latino play-
ers- Henry Aaron, Jackie Robinson, Bob Gibson, Roberto Clemente,
and Juan Marichal-perform as well or better than "the Mick" or "Stan
the Man" or my own favorite pitcher, Warren Spahn;
- occasionally tutoring in a dilapidated school where all the win-
dows rattled when the trains went by- and noticing that all the students
were black or brown;
- observing George Wallace and his cadre of Alabama state troop-
ers on the platform at Notre Dame, joining the sudden rush to the door,
and hearing the shouts of black athletes, the sound of their feet rhythmi-
cally crushing the roof of his car;
- reading Richard Wright and James Baldwin for the first time;
- being hurt and surprised when a close family member literally cut
me out of his will when he heard that I was about to be married in a
Methodist Church;
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-watching the trailers of John Wayne wearing a green beret and
William Calley standing trial for the massacre at My Lai and concluding
that they were part of the same long-running western;
- traveling with my wife, Margaret, to Whitehall in the heart of
London to renew an English residency visa and being told that it was un-
necessary, that the "bog trotters" who first processed our papers in Ire-
land had messed up in a manner oh-so-typical of that benighted race;
- discovering that the English department at the University of Iowa
had revoked Margaret's position as a teaching assistant; as a married
woman now, she could be supported by me, and her stipend could be di-
rected to a deserving male graduate student;
- living in Winona, Minnesota with our infant son, Christopher,
sharing a single position teaching college English but managing to stay
only a hundred dollars above the poverty line. (We were too "rich" to
qualify for subsidized housing. One winter we returned to our drafty cot-
tage to discover the toilet bowl had frozen solid. Our son was afflicted
with chronic ear infections that seriously compromised his hearing.);
- attending law school and reading the Dred Scott decision and
Plessy v. Fergusson for the first time;
-going to Miami in 1980 to undertake a research project for the
Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy and observing
the asylum interviews described in the prelude to this article;
- going to PTA meetings and teachers' conferences at the inte-
grated elementary school where first Christopher and, later, my other
two children, attended;
-joining the Indiana University law faculty and forming deep per-
sonal relationships with black colleagues and their families;
- representing an Iraqi family for seven years in an elaborate series
of INS proceedings, becoming the family members' friends, and helping
them celebrate their victory when they were finally granted political
asylum;
- confronting my father's imperfections and his troubled sexual
identity and learning to come to terms with them as he grew progres-
sively weaker and his heart failed;
- teaching sports law and immigration law to classes where minor-
ity students sometimes constituted the majority and where they almost
always were willing to express themselves openly;
- taking my immigration class to a deportation hearing in Chicago
and watching my Spanish-speaking students mouth the words in English
as a Salvadoran woman sought to explain her situation to the court-
appointed translator;
- traveling to California to visit my brother, Stephen; his Mexican
wife, Letitia (now a naturalized U.S. citizen); and his two Mexican
American children and to visit the overwhelmingly Latino high school in
east Los Angeles where he teaches Spanish and computer science; and
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- reading and becoming angered by Noel Ignatiev's How the Irish
Became White and deciding to make a serious attempt to confront his
method and argument.
B. Race and Racism
My own experiences confirm what science shows 33- that "race" is a
slippery, ultimately arbitrary label and that "racism" is the tendency to
use that label, either overtly or covertly, to justify privilege. I diverge
from Kevin Johnson in my approach to the significance of such labels in
two instances: when they are overt, clearly reflect the legislative will, and
are affixed by law; and conversely, when the law exhibits no overt racial
animus, but the animus nonetheless appears to lurk in the background,
providing, for example, a barely hidden motive for legislation or the
usual condition for the law's application. I will argue that the first sort of
labeling, still possible in immigration law, tended historically to create
more absolute racial categories than Critical Race Theory generally has
recognized. I will argue that the second sort-where the label conceals
rather than reveals -resists legal analysis and, therefore, is particularly
difficult to eradicate.
C. Focus and Audience
Kevin Johnson has focused on the choices immigration scholars
have raised in their selection of topics and their method of addressing
those topics. He is using this issue of the University of Illinois Law Re-
view as his forum for presenting his views to those scholars, minority and
"mainstream." He is also calling on them to respond. I have been ac-
corded the privilege of using these pages to offer my own response.
Obviously, I am speaking to the same people Professor Johnson is
addressing. But I make two distinctions. First, I question his sharp bifur-
cation between critical race scholars and theorists, on the one hand, and
"mainstream immigration scholars focused on legal doctrine," on the
other. I believe that the scholarly universe is messier than this; there ex-
ists more than one branch to the "mainstream," significant crosscurrents
within the Critical Race Theory movement, and various points of conflu-
ence and convergence that sometimes bring scholars from one group or
tradition into close intellectual proximity with scholars from the other.
Second, the issues that his article raises transcend immigration law. I
frame much of my response in terms of immigration law, taking into ac-
count, for example, the fact that immigration scholars, as a group, proba-
bly are more heavily involved with actual clients and more closely en-
gaged with an unresponsive and decidedly unphilosophical bureaucracy
33. See infra notes 45-61 and accompanying text.
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than are most legal academics. Yet the call- and the response- both
resonate in a larger world.
D. Description and Proscriptive Norms
In their joint introduction to Critical Race Theory: The Key Writ-
ings, the editors, Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and
Kendall Thomas, indicate that one of the "common interests" of critical
race theorists "is a desire not merely to understand the vexed bond be-
tween law and racial power but to change it."' Richard Delgado makes a
similar claim in his introduction to Critical Race Theory: The Cutting
Edge.35 In his introduction to LatCrit: Latinas/os and the Law,36 Francisco
Valdes asserts that "LatCrit theory's second function is to be practical as
well as insightful. The importance of practicality commits LatCrit theory
to the advancement of transformation- the creation of material social
change that improves the lives of Latinas/os and other subordinated
groups."37 Here, Kevin Johnson hopes to persuade "mainstream" immi-
gration scholars to accept the "daunting challenge of ensuring the re-
moval of racial discrimination's taint on the development of immigration
law and policy."38
I think I understand the attraction of "activist" or "transformative"
scholarship but am profoundly ambivalent about it. Most of what I have
written probably has had as at least the implicit goal of changing the
world. For example, I have attempted to exert intellectual pressure on
the federal government to pursue a more even-handed, less ideological
refugee admissions policy or to abandon ideological grounds for exclu-
sion and deportation. Yet I have three concerns.
First, I believe that academics in every discipline -including immi-
gration law-have the right to investigate phenomena that they find in-
teresting, even though that investigation has no apparent moral or prac-
tical "pay off." I believe that the "idea of the university" both shelters
and benefits from such research. I find myself resisting any critique that
seeks to compel me to "do" a certain type of scholarship or read a par-
ticular group of authors. I say this even as I acknowledge that I found the
invitation to respond to Kevin Johnson's call too appealing to resist.
Second, I believe that every explicitly "transformative" movement
faces the recurrent dilemma of balancing thick, not very ideologically
34. Kimberlb Crenshaw et al., Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS xiii
(Kimberib Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
35. Richard Delgado, Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE xiv (Rich-
ard Delgado ed., 1995) (characterizing Critical Race Theory as a "challenge to racial oppression").
36. LatCrit: Latinas/os and the Law: A Joint Symposium by California Law Review and La Raza
Law Journal, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1998), 85 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1997).
37. Francisco Valdes, Under Construction: Latcrit Consciousness, Community, and Theory, 85
CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1997).
38. Johnson, supra note 11, at 526.
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satisfying images of a complex universe against thinner, more stream-
lined accounts that convey the desired "message" better. Critical Race
Theory, with its commitment to honest storytelling, confronts this di-
lemma more overtly- and I believe more honestly- than most scholarly
movements. The old adage goes: "To understand all is to forgive all."
Transforming the world has an appeal that forgiveness lacks. Neverthe-
less, I am a strong advocate of thick, morally nuanced descriptions.
Third, moral certitude, even if it is available, will not necessarily
lead to the promised land. Derrick Bell's scholarship is some of the most
impressive produced under the Critical Race Theory banner. Part of
what makes it impressive is his refusal to flinch in the face of what he
considers evidence of four hundred years of unabated, and perhaps un-
abatable, racism-"permanent racism."39 Bell's response is to forge on,
because he must:
I want to contend strongly that neither my assessment that racism is
permanent, nor even Professor [Sidney] Willhelm's prediction that
African American lives are at risk because of their color, is cause
for either despair or surrender. Rather, these dire prognostications
pose a challenge and a basis for lifetime commitment to fight
against the racism that diminishes the lives of its supporters as well
as its victims.4"
For those, however, who accept Bell's "dire" analysis of the prob-
lem and the need for a lifetime commitment to fight against it, the ques-
tion must still remain: in what forum? It is a particularly pertinent ques-
tion when presented to legal academics, who should be as much at home
in the courtroom, the classroom, and the hustings as they are in the pages
of law reviews.
V. THE RESPONSE: MAJOR THEMES
I find Kevin Johnson's argument attractive for several reasons.
First, I subscribe to the underlying assumption that despite major
changes since the 1950s, racism remains an important feature of Ameri-
can public life and continues to influence immigration policy and law.
Second, I subscribe to the notion that society ought to treat the issue
more seriously and that scholars have a role to play in exposing that ra-
cism and imagining alternatives to it. Third- as my own experiences
seem to confirm- I believe that it is necessary to "see" the role that race
plays in a variety of settings, including those that are apparently "neu-
tral," before it can be confronted. I am a strong supporter of first-person
39. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 97-
100 (1992) (arguing that racism is an integral, permanent, and indestructible component of American
society); Derrick Bell, The Racism Is Permanent Thesis: Courageous Revelation or Unconscious Denial
of Racial Genocide, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 571, 571 (1993) (arguing that American racism is a stabilizing
force that enables whites to bind across a wide socioeconomic chasm).
40. Bell, supra note 39, at 572.
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storytelling as a means of creating insight- and believe that scholars in
the critical race movement have been particularly effective in using
highly personalized narratives to convey the continuing "reality" of ra-
cism. Fourth, I believe that the best "critical" scholarship captures the
nuances of complicated situations exceptionally well and provides lucid
and intellectually satisfying explanations of those situations. Fifth, by re-
imagining various historical and contemporary phenomena in terms of
race, the best critical scholars have shifted the analytical playing field.
Even when I disagree with their conclusions- as I sometimes do- I feel
the need to explain why, to refute a strongly argued, race-based theory
by demonstrating deficiencies in its "fit" with the experiential world that
are not readily apparent and the better "fit" that my own "better" expla-
nation provides.
Yet despite its substantial attractions, I also believe that Kevin
Johnson's argument is overly prescriptive. I believe that he oversimplifies
the work of "mainstream" immigration scholars, undervalues the com-
mitment that many have made to justice and racial equality, and too
readily discounts a great deal of nonpolemical, but racially aware schol-
arship. Where he sees a "mainstream," I see many rivulets, some of
which run in directions remarkably similar to those of "critical" scholar-
ship. Where he sees a single-minded commitment to "doctrine," I see a
considerable diversity of approaches and a clear willingness of many
scholars outside the critical race movement to leave the ivory tower and
confront the prejudices of the world where they live. Where he sees a
field dominated by personally liberal, yet intellectually conservative "im-
perial scholars," I see one that is remarkably open to new and often radi-
cal voices.
Finally, I believe that it is necessary to respond directly to one other
feature of Kevin Johnson's challenge. He asks those who do not belong
to the critical race movement to do more than simply engage whole-
heartedly in the "serious analysis of race;"'" he also asks them to engage
more seriously with the work of race theorists. 42 I agree. But although an
engagement with critical race scholarship-and more importantly, with
some of its underlying assumptions about how we recognize and begin to
understand racism- is necessary both personally and professionally, such
an engagement must itself be critical. Two issues particularly demand at-
41. Johnson, supra note 11, at 546.
42. Johnson more frequently uses the term "minority law professors." Id. at 548. In the same
section of his article, he also refers to "minority scholars" and "minority scholars in disciplines other
than law." Id. at 548 n.120. By any name, he suggests, they deserve more attention from established
"mainstream" scholars.
Here, his principal targets appear to be those he believes are part of the "'closed clique of [immigra-
tion] writers almost entirely dependent on self-reference and conventional means"' to promote their
own reputation, as well as the editors of the principal immigration casebooks. Id. at 548 (quoting Shie-
Wei Fan, supra note 23, at 1228). But the remainder of the article makes it clear that he believes that
"mainstream" authors more generally fail to accord minority scholars the attention they deserve.
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tention: the explanatory power of overarching theory and the transfor-
mative power of legal discourse.
If "good theory" illuminates the world, it does so because its expla-
nations account for so much of what we experience or know, establishing
a new way of putting the puzzle together that uses more pieces and does
not cut corners to achieve the proper "fit." But "bad theory" does not il-
luminate; instead it obscures. It deals with messy facts by ignoring
them- or twisting them into unrecognizable shapes. The best critical
race scholarship not only forces us to confront the experience of race in
America directly but also buttresses personal narrative with impressive
research and honestly addresses the complications and uncertainties
posed by that research. The worst critical race scholarship may display
the same narrative immediacy, but it tends to overgeneralize, to offer ex-
planations that don't jibe with the information we already possess about
the world. A fully engaged response must be willing to say that some
"critical" explanations of the way race has influenced, or continues to in-
fluence, immigration policy and law are incomplete, misleading, or out-
right wrong.
Kevin Johnson also challenges "mainstream" scholars to do their
part in "ensuring the removal of racial discrimination's taint" that he be-
lieves continues to affect immigration law and policy.43 I agree that the
"taint" exists and believe that immigration scholars do positive good
when they bring it to the attention of their audiences. At the very least,
they provide ammunition to those who teach immigration law and seek
to substantiate the claim that even facially neutral policies can hide a dis-
criminatory subtext. They also can make converts among their tiny uni-
verse of readers, most of whom probably do teach immigration law. But
"ensure" is an awfully big word. Law professors writing in law reviews
have a very limited ability to "change the world." The fact that many are
practicing lawyers may well lead them to address racial questions more
actively- by writing legal briefs heavy with doctrine, for example, so that
a particular Palestinian or Haitian or Cuban or Guatemalan may avoid
deportation-or by orchestrating communal protests against discrimina-
tory or arbitrary treatment."a
VI. THREE REMAINING ISSUES
A. The Significance of the "Social Construction" of Race
According to Donald Braman, "[i]nvestigations into race dominated
nineteenth-century social science, and most theorists of the time assumed
43. Id. at 526.
44. Johnson has advocated using clinical programs and the insights they generate to pursue di-
rect action of this sort. See Kevin R. Johnson & Amagda Perez, Clinical Legal Education and the U. C.
Davis Immigration Law Clinic: Putting Theory into Practice and Practice into Theory
51 SMU L. REV. 1423 (1998).
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a link between human biology, ability, character, and culture."45 Long be-
fore "modern" experimental science emerged, however, the assumption
that such a link existed already had profoundly influenced American
public policy and law. Thus, as Nicholas Canny,46 Francis Jennings,47 and
Winthrop Jordan,48 among many others, have so ably demonstrated, the
brutality that was characteristic of European colonization generally-
and that played such an important role in the English conquest and reset-
tlement of America- had its roots in theories of racial superiority al-
ready evident when the English sought to "plant" Ireland in the late six-
teenth century and crossed the Atlantic with the first English
"adventurers" to America in the seventeenth century.
Nevertheless, Braman's article, Race and Immutability, focuses on
nineteenth-century racial theory, its purported "scientific" justifications,
and its broad repudiation by the scientific and the legal community that
began no later than 1923.49 His article is perhaps the most thorough ac-
count of the reasons why, since the early decades of this century, the idea
that physical appearance or ethnic heritage dictates ability or character
has been thoroughly discredited. We can probably take it as a given that
no contemporary scholar is going to claim, as the English surgeon Char-
les White did in 1799, that "there exist material differences in the organi-
zation and constitution of various tribes of the human species; and not
only so, but that those differences, generally, mark a regular gradation,
45. Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1375, 1410 (1999).
46. See Nicholas P. Canny, The Ideology of English Colonization: From Ireland to America, 30
WM. & MARY Q. 575 (1973); see also Nicholas Canny, Ireland in the First British Empire, in
STRANGERS WITHIN THE REALM: CULTURAL MARGINS OF THE FIRST BRITISH EMPIRE 35-66 (Ber-
nard Bailyn & Philip D. Morgan eds., 1991).
47. See FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE INVASION OF AMERICA: INDIANS, COLONIALISM, AND THE
CANT OF CONQUEST (1975).
48. See WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATrITUDES TOWARD THE
NEGRO 1550-1812 (1968); see also Winthrop D. Jordan, American Chiaroscuro: The Status and Defi-
nition of Mulattoes in the British Colonies, 19 WM & MARY Q. 183, 183-86 (1962).
49. See Braman, supra note 45, at 1404-06 (discussing the background and rationale of the Su-
preme Court's opinion in United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923)). In Thind, the Supreme Court
decided to dismiss racial science, in part because "[tihe various authorities are in irreconcilable dis-
agreement as to what constitutes a proper racial division." Id. at 212. Discussing this "irreconcilable
disagreement," Braman tells us that the Court "nodded to a theory that is not far from contemporary
understandings of human biodiversity." Braman, supra note 45, at 1406. More specifically, the Court
found that:
The explanation [of the difficulties of arriving at "scientific" agreement] probably is that "the in-
numerable varieties of mankind run into one another by insensible degrees," [and] to arrange
them in sharply bounded divisions is an undertaking of such uncertainty that common agreement
is practically impossible.
Thind, 261 U.S. at 212 (quoting 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 502 (11th ed. 1913)).
As Braman notes, another reading of Thind and its immediate predecessor, Ozawa v. United States,
260 U.S. 178 (1922), is possible: "Certainly it can be (and has been) argued that the Court's develop-
ment of a legal conception of race in these cases stands as a confounding of both science and history to
suit a racist agenda." Braman, supra note 45, at 1409 & n.132 (citing Ian Haney L6pez, The Prerequi-
site Cases, in RACIAL CLASSIFICATION AND HISTORY 53 (E. Nathan Gates ed., 1997); Mark S. Weiner,
Immigration and Naturalization Law: Some Empirical Observations, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 657, 658
(1998)).
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from the white European down through the human species to the brute
creation."5 °
The furor attending the publication of The Bell Curvefl a decade
ago indicates that even more limited claims, such as the assertion that
human intelligence is inherited and that significant statistical variations
exist between racial groups in America, are automatically suspect. Much
of the suspicion undoubtedly stems from concerns about the political
uses to which such assertions are likely to be put. But some also stems
from the inherent unreliability of "race" as a classifying device and its
Procrustean tendency to wedge people of demonstrably different ances-
try, different physical characteristics, and different genetic profiles into a
few rigid categories-and to ignore cross-categorical similarities. 2 Noel
Ignatiev thus expressed a common- and, it appears, easily defended-
opinion when he wrote:
No biologist has ever been able to provide a satisfactory defini-
tion of "race"- that is, a definition that includes all members of a
given race and excludes all others. Attempts to give the term a bio-
logical foundation lead to absurdities .... The only logical conclu-
sion is that people are members of different races because they
have been assigned to them.53
In a sense, Braman's article is "the last word" on the subject, a care-
ful recapitulation of arguments that have been made, developed, tested,
and modified over the course of the twentieth century. Yet in another
sense, there can be no "last word." A major part of the Critical Race
Theory project always has been to deconstruct race, to demonstrate that
it is a social rather than a biological construction-something that isn't
really a fact but instead is an empty name, imprecise, changeable, and
easily manipulated to marginalize particular groups of people who really
are being victimized for other reasons. As long as society at large contin-
50. REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND MANIFEST DESTINY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
RACIAL ANGLO-SAXONISM 50 (1981) (quoting CHARLES WHITE, ACCOUNT OF THE REGULAR
GRADATION OF MAN 83 (London, Dilly 1799)).
51. RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE (1994).
52. The genetic evidence has proven to be particularly powerful, since it directly counters the
idea-that served as the cornerstone of chattel slavery and, later, of de jure racial segregation- that
race is somehow "inherited" or "passed on" from one generation to the next. For example, Braman
reports:
In 1972, population biologist Richard Lewontin of Harvard University, analyzing seventeen ge-
netic markers in 168 populations as diverse as Austrians, Thais, and Apaches, found that there
was greater genetic difference within each race than between races, demonstrating that racial dis-
tinctions were biologically arbitrary. A series of studies [subsequently undertaken] would confirm
and expand upon [early works, such as Lewontin's], providing not only a better understanding of
human biodiversity, but a substantial move away from the popular terms of racialism.
Braman, supra note 45, at 1428.
53. IGNATIEV, supra note 2, at 1. For a brilliant study of the process of "assignment" in the legal
arena, see IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996). Haney
L6pez takes as his subject the historical racial prerequisite to naturalization, legal identification as a
"white person." Id. at 37-47. Analyzing a series of cases decided in state and federal courts over a pe-
riod of more than fifty years, he demonstrates how result-oriented and unscientific racial categoriza-
tion in the hands of state and federal judges proved to be. See id. at 49-77.
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ues to use racial classifications as if they were real, those subject to those
classifications will continue to challenge the validity of the classifying
process- and the motives of those who employ it. 4
Two key-and closely related-concepts in the critical race litera-
ture are the "one drop of blood rule" and "passing." The one drop of
blood rule "provides that an individual with any level of black ancestry,
even as little as 'one drop,' must be classified as black. 55 "Passing" is not
so exclusively restricted to African Americans. Thus, Kevin Johnson ap-
plies the concept to light-skinned Latinos like himself and his brother-
native speakers of English who can "choose" to join "Anglo" society. 6
More commonly, however, the term has been applied to describe move-
ment across the traditional black-white "color line."57 Although tradi-
tionally the term resonated with the idea of imposture- even "bad
faith"- it has in large measure been redefined by critical race scholars as
a point of reference from which to criticize the very concept of a "color
line." Alex Johnson has made this point explicitly:
54. See Derrick Bell, Who's Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893. Professor
Bell writes:
For the past three or four months, a great deal of attention and energy has been devoted to com-
mending and condemning Mr. Charles Murray and the late Dr. Richard Herrnstein, authors of
the best-selling book on racial intelligence, The Bell Curve. This book suggests great social policy
significance in the fact that black people score, on average, fifteen points below whites on I.Q.
tests.
This thesis has been criticized as the rehashing of views long-ago rejected by virtually all ex-
perts in the field. There is, critics maintain, no basis for finding that intelligence is inherited and,
indeed, no accepted definition of the vague term "intelligence." There is, on the other hand, a de-
pressingly strong and invariant correlation between resources and race in this country and re-
sources and success- including success in taking I.Q. tests. These are settled facts.
Criticism of The Bell Curve has been so universal among biologists that one must wonder:
Why did these two well-known men produce a book full of rejected theories?
Id. at 893-94. One need not agree with Professor Bell's sweeping assertion about what the "settled
facts" are to appreciate his continuing need to recapitulate the argument.
55. Alex M. Johnson, Destabilizing Racial Classifications Based on Insights Gleaned from
Trademark Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 887, 888 n.6 (1996). Johnson cites as historical authority for the
genesis of the "one drop of blood" rule Paul Finkelman, The Crime of Color, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2063,
2110 (1993).
56. Johnson, supra note 3, at 223-24.
57. See Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and Sexual
Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REv. 263,268-69 (1995).
The actual skin colors of Americans, of course, have always ranged over a broad continuum of
lightness and darkness. But the social notions of whiteness and blackness have never been re-
garded as points along such a continuum. Rather, for most Americans- the notable exceptions
being peoples who were here before any European immigrants arrived, immigrants from Asia
and Mesoamerica, and the progeny of both groups- the social world was sharply divided into two
racial categories. "Passing for white" meant that a person had moved from one side of this binary
division to the other- but the assumption remained that he or she was really black, and just got
away with a racial imposture.
Id.; see also Alfreda A. Sellers Diamond, Becoming Black in America: A Book Review Essay of Life
on the Color Line by Gregory Howard Williams, 67 MISS. L.J. 427, 431 n.21 (1997) ("'Passing' is a
common way for African-Americans of very light skin color to alter their identity and transfer to the
white community.") (citing VIRGINIA R. DOMINGUEZ, WHITE BY DEFINITION 161 (1986)): Johnson,
supra note 55, at 919 n.125 (1996) (defining "passing" as "a situation where a black individual, due to
her light pigmentation, appears white and therefore may 'pass' for white in American society despite
the 'one drop' rule").
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The "one drop" rule allowed whites to preserve the mark of
whiteness by excluding from that classification all individuals who
had less than 100% white heritage. At one time, when blacks were
viewed as less human and less deserving of rights, this rule may
have been efficient and appropriate to protect the white consuming
public from deception. To allow blacks to classify themselves as
whites would work a fraud on the public, thereby undermining the
notion of whiteness as a superior mark or product.
This is perhaps the reason that "passing" was viewed so harshly
by whites at the time when racial differences were reified and le-
galized. The phenomenon of passing had the effect of undermining
the mark of whiteness. It allowed blacks to produce a product, a
visibly white person when viewed phenotypically, that had the ef-
fect of undermining the product of whiteness, which was defined as
the absence of blackness or any black ancestors. In a world in which
passing existed liberally, the ultimate outcome would be the deni-
gration of whiteness as a product because whites could no longer
claim that they were different or distinct from blacks if (1) they
could be produced by black parents or (2) if they could not be dif-
ferentiated from the offspring of black parents.
In effect, if the "one drop" rule did not exist and racial categories
were instead based exclusively upon phenotype and the rule of rec-
ognition, so that if one looks white one is classified as white irre-
spective of one's parentage or heritage, this would almost com-
pletely destroy the allegedly superior mark of whiteness. 8
A similar perception of the artificiality of the traditional "color line"
lends considerable force to the biographical and autobiographical stories
told by Cheryl Harris59 and Judy Scales-Trent,60 among others, in recent
years."
The attempt to deconstruct race strikes me as an important and
worthy goal. Yet I have two reservations. First, to insist that race is a so-
cial construction does not get us very far. Banishing biology from the mix
is an important first step-but it is only that, a first step. We still must
consider why racial categories resist change and must examine the ways
that they not only help shape the law but also are themselves shaped by
law. Second, stories of oppression, resistance, and choice help us to un-
derstand the role that racism has played in society and will convert some
of those who read or listen to the "cause" of a society that does not dis-
58. Johnson, supra note 55, at 919-20; see also Bell, supra note 54, at 904-07 (retelling and inter-
preting the story Cheryl Harris told about her grandmother's "passing" in Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness
as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1710-12 (1993)).
59. See Harris, supra note 58, at 1710-12.
60. See JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NoTEs OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN (1995); Judy Scales-Trent,
Commonalities: On Being Black and White, Different, and the Same. 1990 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 305
(1990).
61. For other such accounts, see generally PASSING AND THE FICTIONS OF IDENTITY (Elaine K.
Ginsberg ed., 1996).
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criminate against migrants or any other disempowered minority. But
translating such awareness into constructive legal change- transforming
the fundamental institutions of society, if you will- is an immensely dif-
ficult task, not only from a practical level but also from a theoretical one.
B. Experience, Stories, Policy, and Law
In his introduction to Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge, Rich-
ard Delgado tells us:
Critical Race Theory's challenge to racial oppression and the
status quo sometimes takes the form of storytelling, in which writers
analyze the myths, presuppositions, and received wisdoms that
make up the common culture about race, and that invariably render
blacks and other minorities one-down. Starting from the premise
that a culture constructs social reality in a way that promotes its
own self-interests (or that of elite groups), these scholars set out to
construct a different reality. Our social world, with its rules, prac-
tices, and assignments of prestige and power, is not fixed; rather, we
construct it with words, stories, and silence. But we need not acqui-
esce in arrangements that are unfair and one-sided. By writing and
speaking against them, we may hope to contribute to a better, fairer
world.62
Derrick Bell tells us that "[c]ritical race theory writing and lecturing
is characterized by frequent use of the first person, storytelling, narrative,
allegory, interdisciplinary treatment of law, and the unapologetic use of
creativity."'63 According to Bell, "[t]he narrative voice, the teller, is im-
portant to critical race theory in a way not understandable by those
whose voices are tacitly deemed legitimate and authoritarian. The voice
exposes, tells and retells, signals resistance and caring, and reiterates
what kind of power is feared most- the power of commitment to
change."'64
Implicit in what Delgado and Bell are writing are two propositions:
that those who have been, or presently are, subordinated can offer a
counterdiscourse, a retelling of familiar tales from another perspective
capable of piercing the comfortable armor of complacency worn so
lightly by "majority" listeners; and that such stories can not only signal a
"commitment to change" (Bell) 65 but, perhaps, a "contribut[ion] to a bet-
ter, fairer world" (Delgado).' The lever for such change is the "persua-
sive power" of narrative:
There is great persuasive power in narrative. Sara Lawrence
Lightfoot locates the source of this power in the story's ability to in-
62. Delgado, supra note 35, at xiv.
63. Bell, supra note 54, at 899.
64. Id. at 907.
65. Id.
66. Delgado, supra note 35, at xiv.
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spire feelings of commonality and connectedness among tellers, lis-
teners, and subjects of stories: "[S]tories express depth and com-
plexity. They allow for ambiguity, multiple interpretation, and re-
fracted images. The reader or listener can be convinced and moved,
by intellect and emotion. And stories are not exclusive property.
One story invites another as people's words weave the tapestry of
human connection. '67
One story invites another. I believe that the first proposition-the
possibility of communication- can be demonstrated by recounting a per-
sonal experience fairly typical, I think, of immigration scholars. Reading
or listening can change the perspective of the reader or listener. Yet the
same story also casts skeptical light on the second proposition- the pos-
sibility of instrumental change. It does not demonstrate that such change
is impossible, but it does show that the law resists modification when ex-
periences enter the courts and that even sympathetic judges find it diffi-
cult to reverse policies supported by facially neutral laws.
Nearly twenty years ago, Gil Loescher and I began work on a proj-
ect that, seven years later, produced Calculated Kindness,' our history of
U.S. refugee policy and law. Our training and experiences affected our
approach. Gil is a former seminarian. When I first met him, he was a
young, untenured member of the political science faculty at Notre Dame.
He was passionately committed to the cause of human rights and had al-
ready begun to look closely at the ways that institutions -particularly in-
ternational humanitarian institutions, such as the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Interna-
tional Red Cross-worked to alleviate suffering. I had entered law
school six years earlier with a Ph.D. in English and fresh memories of the
various humiliations experienced by my wife and myself as we attempted
to secure permanent teaching positions in the cutthroat academic market
of the early 1970s. We seemed powerless to guarantee our future or fend
off the petty injustices so common in the lives of untenured and part-time
faculty members. I believed then that going to law school could only
help. I wasn't exactly sure how. I had an uncle of sorts who was a lawyer
and made a good living, but I had never been particularly close to him or
interested in his work. Getting a law degree seemed to be the easiest way
to gain power.
Law school confirmed what Henry Kissinger's career had already
demonstrated: the law does not provide remedies for every wrong. But
two summers spent as a law clerk working for the state of New Jersey in-
troduced me to the ways that institutions use the law to promote their
ends- good, bad, or indifferent. I drafted papers to shut down dangerous
67. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as Struggle, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 2231, 2279 (1992) (quoting Sara Lawrence Lightfoot, Balm in Gilead: On Love, Justice
and the Word, Address Before the Equal Rights Advocates (June 15, 1988)).
68. GIL LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES AND AMERICA'S
HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE PRESENT (1986).
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carnival rides and to force a contractor to pay the prevailing wage- and
also to deprive a Rutgers student of the opportunity to sue the state for
the damage inflicted on his car in a state-owned parking garage. I was
part of the team that tried to convince the Supreme Court that the state
had no obligation to "deinstitutionalize" its mental patients.
I completed law school at Notre Dame and stayed on at the Center
for Civil and Human Rights. When Father Theodore M. Hesburgh, the
long-time president of Notre Dame, was appointed by President Carter
to head the United States Select Commission on Immigration and Refu-
gee Policy, he asked the Center for help. Gil and I provided it.69
Our mission appeared to have little or nothing to do with race. In-
stead, it addressed the history of U.S. refugee admissions policy, the gov-
ernment's response to the massive Indochinese migration that was then
occurring, its concurrent response to the Cuban-Haitian refugee "crisis"
just beginning to unfold, and the adequacy of the newly enacted Refugee
Act to deal with these and other emergencies. We tried to determine
how policy had been made; whether it reflected explicit or implicit goals;
whether those goals had been met; and if not, whether the problem was
with the goals themselves or the means chosen to accomplish them.
Much of what we read was heavily larded with statistics, generalizations,
and the impersonal language so common in statutes and governmental
reports. Most of those we interviewed were employed by the State De-
partment, the INS, UNHCR, state and local governments, and the pri-
vate voluntary organizations that played a major role assisting and reset-
tling refugees. Many gave us careful answers that presented the "official"
positions of their respective organizations. We evaluated that informa-
tion and used it in the reports we submitted to the Select Commission
and in articles we published together and separately.7" My first law re-
69. See, e.g., STAFF OF SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, ADMISSION
OF REFUGEES AND ASYLEES UNDER THE LAW: REPORTS ON CURRENT U.S. PROCEDURES AND
POLICIES AND THEIR ORIGINS (1980), partially reprinted in HOUSE & SENATE COMMS. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NAT'L INTEREST 153 (Joint Comm.
Print 1981). Sharon O'Brien, another political scientist, participated in two studies the Center con-
ducted that examined the ways that U.S. immigration law affected North American Indians. All of us
benefited from the assistance of graduate students and law students.
70. See, e.g., GILBURT D. LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLAN, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS
IMPACT ON REFUGEE FLOW FROM HAITI (Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, New
York University, Occasional Paper No. 42, 1984); JOHN A. SCANLAN & GILBURT D. LOESCHER,
REFUGEES, POWER POLITICS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE REGIME: THE CASE OF U.S.
TREATMENT OF CARIBBEAN BASIN REFUGEES (Center of International Studies, Princeton University,
World Order Studies Program, Occasional Paper No. 14, 1985); Gilburt Loescher & John Scanlan,
Human Rights, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Haitian Refugees, 26 J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD
AFF. 313 (1984); G.D. Loescher & John Scanlan, 'Mass Asylum' and U.S. Policy in the Caribbean, 37
WORLD TODAY 387 (1981); John A. Scanlan & G.D. Loescher, Mass Asylum and Human Rights in
American Foreign Policy, 97 POL. SCI. Q. 39 (1982); John A. Scanlan, Asylum Adjudication: Some Due
Process Implications of Proposed Immigration Legislation, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 261 (1983); John A.
Scanlan, Immigration Law and the Illusion of Numerical Control, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 819 (1982);
John A. Scanlan, Regulating Refugee Flow: Legal Alternatives and Obligations Under the Refugee Act
of 1980, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 618 (1981), reprinted in 5 IMMIGR. & NATIONALITY L. REV. 157
(1982); Gilburt Loescher & John Scanlan, Preface to ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., May
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view articles perhaps were not as "doctrinal" as Kevin Johnson believes
most "mainstream" scholarship to be-but they were likely as "juice-
less."
Yet some of the things that we read and heard then, and with in-
creasing frequency in the years that followed after we had begun work on
our book, were considerably more heartfelt. Most dealt with the suffer-
ings of refugees and with the frustrations of those who confronted politi-
cal obstacles while attempting to alleviate that suffering. For example, a
former commissioner of immigration dispatched by President Truman to
Europe in 1945 "to inquire into the conditions and needs of displaced
persons in Germany who may be stateless or nonrepatriable, particularly
Jews," conducted his inquiry and then responded: "We appear to be
treating the Jews as the Nazis treated them except that we do not exter-
minate them."71 Thirty-six years later, President Ronald Reagan "issued
an executive order directing the United States Coast Guard to intercept
boats laden with Haitians sailing in the general direction of the United
States and tow them back to Port-au-Prince."72 This marked the begin-
ning of the so-called Haitian interdiction program, which, despite signifi-
cant outcry and legal challenges, remained essentially intact for a dozen
years- and continues to this day.73 When Poul Hartling, the commis-
1983, at 9; John Scanlan & Gilburt Loescher, U.S. Foreign Policy, 1959-80: Impact on Refugee Flow
from Cuba, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI., May 1983, at 116; John A. Scanlan, Who Is a Refu-
gee? Procedures and Burden of Proof Under the Refugee Act of 1980, in 5 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN
23 (Lydio F. Tomasi ed., 1983).
71. Displaced Persons in Germany: Letter from President Truman to General Eisenhower
(transmitting report of Earl G. Harrison) (Aug. 31, 1945), in U.S. DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1945, at 45,
455; Report of Earl G. Harrison, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1945, at 456, 461. For addi-
tional material quoted from both documents, see LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 68, at 4.
72. LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 68, at 188 (citing Exec. Order No 12,324,46 Fed. Reg. 48,
109 (1981)).
73. For a good summary of the Haitian interdiction program up to 1993, see Keith Highet et al.,
Aliens-Interdiction of Haitians on High Seas-Definition of "Return" Under U.S. Statute-Extraterritorial
Effect of Statute, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 114 (1994).
The interdiction program was the result of a bilateral agreement entered into between the
United States and Haiti, then ruled by Jean-Claude Duvalier .... However, the bilateral agree-
ment, Executive Order No. 12,324 and the Immigration and Naturalization Service's Guide-
lines.., promulgated to effectuate the interdiction program all provided that those who were ac-
corded political refugee status would not be returned to Haiti. Pursuant to the INS Guidelines,
Haitians interdicted on the high seas were to be interviewed at sea to determine if they were po-
litical refugees with a credible fear of persecution. If a refugee was found to have a credible fear
of persecution, he would be "screened in" and permitted to enter the United States to apply for
political asylum. The others were "screened out" and repatriated to Haiti. Later, in November
1991, the United States opened the [military] base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for the purpose of
interviewing interditees.
On May 24, 1992, President George Bush, by Executive Order No. 12,807 (Kennebunkport
Order) [57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992)], terminated the screening process and allowed the Coast
Guard to interdict Haitians on the high seas and immediately return them to Haiti without mak-
ing any determination as to their political refugee status.
Id. at 114-15.
The Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. (HRC) and the Haitian Centers Council, Inc. (HCC), nonprofit
organizations assisting Haitian immigrants, brought class actions in federal court challenging the Ken-
nebunkport Order and other aspects of the interdiction program on a number of grounds, including
alleged violation of Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and INA
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sioner of UNHCR, initially refused to take up the matter forcefully with
the U.S. government, his refusal "provoked a storm of protest in the
ranks of the UNHCR. 74
Time and again, Gil and I heard stories from those we were inter-
viewing about the ways that geopolitical concerns and big-power politics
hampered the delivery of aid and the process of resettlement. Only occa-
sionally did we hear from migrants themselves, something I now regret.
When we did hear from them, they forced us to confront policy and law
at a deeper, more immediate level- and invited us to see traces of racism
where before we had seen only ordinary Hobbesian politics.
A few words about those politics before I discuss that "invitation:"
Gil and I had been led by our reading and our interviews to notice the
glaring disparity between the treatment of Cuban and Haitian migrants
by the Department of State and the INS. I believed then- and I still be-
lieve now- that American refugee policy had been shaped in large
measure by the ideological struggle between east and west and by the na-
tion's consequent willingness to weigh the mistreatment that communist
regimes inflicted on their own nationals much more heavily than the mis-
treatment that right-wing regimes inflicted. Russians, Poles, Hungarians,
Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians- even Nicaraguans fleeing
Daniel Ortega's Sandinista regime- generally were presumed to be
refugees. The fact that they had lived in a socialist state and had fled es-
§ 243(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1), which barred the "refoulement" or forcible "return" of aliens
whose life or safety was threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion. The
HRC's case, which initially was brought before the Kennebunkport Order was issued, reached the
Eleventh Circuit three times but proved unsuccessful. See Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 949
F.2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1991); Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 950 F.2d 685 (11th Cir. 1991); Hai-
tian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992). The HCC fared better in the Sec-
ond Circuit. See Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992). However, the
Supreme Court, in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993), determined that neither
the interdiction program nor the Kennebunkport Order violated U.S. or international law.
When the Clinton administration took office, it continued the interdiction program and the direct
return of boat people to Haiti without the benefit of an opportunity to apply for asylum. See Office of
the Press Secretary, The White House, Statement by George Stephanopolous (Mar. 2, 1993)
<http://www.inform.umd.edu/EdRes/Topic/US+W/US/AgenciesExec/WHouse/Speeches/l993/March/
haitian-asylum> (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review). The Clinton administration tem-
porarily suspended the forcible return of Haitians during the unrest associated with the coup that tem-
porarily unseated President Jean-Bertrand Aristide but after participating in the multinational military
effort to restore Aristide to office, resumed the practice again in December 1994. See S.C. Res. 940,
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994); see also National Coalition for Hai-
tian Rights, Expanding Effectiveness Despite the Odds: A Progress Report of NCHR Activities in 1995
<http://www.nchr.org/mnd/1995.htm>.
As amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 604(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-690, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) provides that "[a]ny alien
who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a
designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been
interdicted in international or United States waters), irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for
asylum." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (Supp. 111996). The statute is conspicuously silent, however, about the
right to apply for asylum if the "interdicted" alien is not brought to the United States.
74. LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 68, at 194 (quoting Refugee Law Violated, GUARDIAN
(Manchester, England), Dec. 10, 1981).
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tablished that they had been persecuted- or would be if they were
forced to return. No such presumption ordinarily was afforded to those
who fled other types of regimes, however brutal they ordinarily were.
Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Chileans, Ethiopians, Somalians- even
Nicaraguans fleeing Anastasio Somoza's despotic regime- generally
were not granted conditional permanent resident status or parole (a term
provided by the law in effect until 1980) or granted asylum or offered
special refugee visas (as provided by the Refugee Act of 1980)."5 Only
when substantial political pressure was brought would some of these un-
fortunate people be granted temporary relief from deportation ("ex-
tended voluntary departure" under pre-1994 law; "temporary protected
status" under new provisions adopted that year). Most, however, would
be turned away at the border- and if they entered illegally or overstayed
their visas, would be deported. Deportation as the norm, we believed,
was the natural consequence of treating immigration as a zero-sum game,
in which it was assumed (often without much analysis) that only a limited
number of "admissions" could be offered before the presence of too
many migrants destabilized the polity.
We recognized that many of those customarily turned away were
black. But we also recognized that many of those admitted were Asian or
Hispanic.76 We knew that American willingness to welcome Cubans as
refugees was firmly grounded in cold war politics. We believed that
American unwillingness to accept Haitians as refugees was, in large
measure, simply the other side of the same political coin.
In some sense it was. Yet the invitation that experience extended -
one that I did not fully recognize or accept- was to examine the coin
more closely and observe that it was not necessarily symmetrical. Strong
political reasons could prompt the immigration bureaucracy to ignore
race in particular situations or place it on the back burner. But in the ab-
75. The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
76. During the first years after the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, Asian refugees were
granted the great majority of visas made available under the annual presidential determinations man-
dated by section 207. Migrants from Central America and the Caribbean were allocated far fewer visas
but arrived on American shores in substantial numbers seeking asylum. In November 1983, James
Fallows reported:
In 1980, at least 125,000 Cubans and Haitians arrived in southern Florida and were admitted as
"special entrants," a category invented to cope with the influx. Since 1975, the U.S. has accepted
over half a million refugees from Indochina. More than 160,000 came in 1980 alone, which to-
gether with the Cubans and Haitians pushed that year's total for legal admissions to 808,000, the
highest in sixty years.
James Fallows, Immigration: How It's Affecting Us, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1983, at 45-68, 85-
106, available in <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/immigrat/fallowf.htm>.
Presidential Determination No. 83-11, issued shortly before Fallows published his article, estab-
lished a "ceiling" of "72,000 worldwide refugee admissions" for fiscal year 1984. These "were allocated
among the regions of the world as follows: 50,000 for East Asia; 12,000 for the Soviet Union/Eastern
Europe; 6,000 for the Near East/South Asia; 3,000 for Africa; and 1,000 for Latin Amer-
ica/Caribbean." T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 624 (1985).
Anticommunist refugee policies also favored Russian Jews- a group that was the target of vicious
racial stereotyping before and during the era of "national origins quotas."
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sence of those reasons, an underlying racism could help account for dif-
ferential treatment. We were given our first clues when we interviewed
those working on behalf of the Haitians in Miami and New York. Most
were white, and many were lawyers- a fact that I believe has signifi-
cance. They told us that the Haitians' skin color, accents, and poverty
subjected them to discrimination by Anglos, Latinos, and other dark-
skinned minorities.
Judge James L. King gave us another clue in Haitian Refugee Center
v. Civiletti.77 In that opinion, he noted:
Those Haitians who came to the United States seeking freedom
and justice did not find it. Instead, they were confronted with an
Immigration and Naturalization Service determined to deport them.
The decision was made among high INS officials to expel Haitians,
despite whatever claims to asylum individual Haitians might have.
A Program was set up to accomplish this goal. The Program re-
sulted in wholesale violations of due process, and only Haitians
were affected.78
Judge King explicitly contrasted the treatment afforded the Haitians with
that accorded the Cubans and suggested the disparity had a racial cast:
The plaintiffs are part of the first substantial flight of black refugees
from a repressive regime to this country. All of the plaintiffs are
black.... Prior to the most recent Cuban exodus, all of the Cubans
who sought political asylum... were granted asylum routinely.
None of the over 4,000 Haitians processed during the INS "pro-
gram" at issue in the lawsuit were granted asylum. No greater dis-
parity can be imagined.79
But perhaps the most important clue manifested itself when I visited
the INS processing center in Liberty City and observed the parallel, yet
very different processing methods of Cuban and Haitian "boat people"
detailed in the prelude to this article. The Cuban man and the Haitian
woman were both desperately poor. They both sought an identical bene-
fit- asylum-available only to those who demonstrate a "well-founded
fear of persecution" on account of race, religion, nationality, or ethnic
origin; political activity or political opinion; or membership in some
group- such as a trade union- that put them at risk.s The statute does
not grant asylum on the basis of poverty. Those administering it have al-
ways been particularly suspicious of third-world applicants and particu-
larly receptive to applicants from Europe. The race of the applicant is
77. 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), affd in part and rev'd in part sub noma. Haitian Refugee
Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
78. Id. at 532.
79. Id. at 451.
80. INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1994) (providing the discretionary grant of "asylum" to persons
who meet the statutory definition of refugee). The statute defines a refugee as a person "unwilling" or
"unable" to return home "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." INA
§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
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not a statutory criterion for granting asylum or denying it. But the appli-
cant's credibility is an issue, as is whatever evidence the applicant can
present8 indicating that he has been "singled out" for persecution be-
cause he possesses a characteristic protected by the statute.8 2 Some appli-
cants arrive with travel documents; most arrive with only their stories.
Somehow, "white" Europeans almost always manage to tell more con-
vincing stories than do "black" or "brown" people from Africa, the West
Indies, or Central America. Under other circumstances, the coffee-
colored Cuban man and the darker Haitian woman, both of whom ar-
rived from islands in this hemisphere, might have provoked similar INS
suspicions. After all, neither explained the "persecution" the act requires
they demonstrate. Indeed, the Cuban man, with his clear intention of
joining his family in the United States, spoke at cross-purposes to the
statutory requirement. In contrast, the Haitian woman's misery was pal-
pable- and still open to any interpretation as to what had caused it.
Why then the disparate treatment? Cold war politics certainly
played a part. Southern Florida politics also played a part; originally,
members of the politically influential Cuban community in Miami were
ferrying the "Marielitos" to the mainland." But the disparity not only in-
volved a relaxation of ordinary immigration standards when a large in-
flux of Cubans reached U.S. shores in 1980 but also involved a tightening
of those standards that had begun more than two years earlier when a
much smaller Haitian influx began. As Judge King wrote in the Haitian
Refugee Center case, "[m]ost Cuban refugees were not processed under 8
C.F.R. § 108 [the predecessor to today's 8 C.F.R. § 208] because of spe-
cial presidential and congressional action. However, all those who were
processed in individual proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 108 did receive
asylum."'8 In contrast, Haitians were subjected to a unique program in-
tended to deny them any real opportunity to obtain asylum. They were
not only denied special congressional intervention but also the opportu-
nity to be heard with their attorneys present.8" This and similar govern-
81. This was true in the early 1980s and is still true today, although considerable uncertainty
about the alien's burden of demonstrating probable or merely possible persecution was resolved in
INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). For the current regulations relating to the provision of
information, conduct of the hearing, evidence, and burden of proof, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.9, 208.12, and
208.13.
82. This requirement was always implicit in the statute. It was interpreted restrictively in INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
83. See LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 68, at 182-84. At the peak of the Mariel crisis, in
April 1980, "over 1500 boats manned by Cuban-Americans were standing off Mariel harbor waiting to
take on Cuban emigr6s." Id. at 184.
84. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. at 451 n.1.
85. See id. at 460 n.33.
Cause of action 3 alleges that immigration judges permitted INS to schedule deportation hearings
simultaneously or in rapid succession with each other and with independent asylum interviews be-
fore the District Director. Again, the alleged cumulative effect of this practice was to deprive the
class of a fair hearing with the assistance of counsel and other due process rights.
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mental behavior 6 prompted Judge King to conclude: "One central issue,
however, overshadows this entire case: unlawful discrimination. The
plaintiffs charge that they faced a transparently discriminatory program
designed to deport Haitian nationals and no one else. The uncontro-
verted evidence proves their claim."87
Reading transcripts and depositions and listening to the testimony
of INS officers, government lawyers, and Haitian "boat people" con-
vinced Judge King that racial animus, and not simple cold war politics,
played the key role in determining the government's response. To con-
clude this, of course, at least implicitly he had to conclude that sometimes
the government favors some nonwhite people over others, that not all
potential victims of discrimination always are going to be perceived as
equally far down the ladder, or- in Derrick Bell's terms- as "faces at
the bottom of the well."'
Two years later, the Fifth Circuit decided the appeal. It accepted
Judge King's factual findings and asserted:
Recognizing the existence of an entitlement in the right to peti-
tion for political asylum does not define the particulars of what the
government may or may not do in making a decision on that peti-
tion. Mindful of the Supreme Court's admonition that courts ought
not impose constitutional restraints which would inhibit the ability
of the political branches to respond through immigration policy to
changing world conditions, we hold simply that the government
violates the fundamental fairness which is the essence of due proc-
ess when it creates a right to petition and then makes the exercise of
that right utterly impossible.89
The Fifth Circuit found that the district court had acted correctly in
requiring the INS to modify its procedures:
We therefore find sufficient legal warrant under the Fifth Amend-
ment for that part of the district judge's order requiring the gov-
ernment to submit a procedurally fair plan for the orderly reproc-
essing of the plaintiffs' asylum applications.'
And in a pregnant footnote, the court found:
that the district court properly exercised its jurisdiction under 8
U.S.C. § 1329 to order the government to submit a reprocessing
plan which adheres to INS regulations and operating procedures.
Whether or not these procedures are mandated by the due process
86. For example:
[T]he Haitians "come here with the expectation that they should reach a land of freedom. What
they found was an Immigration Service which sought to send them back to Haiti without any
hearing by an immigration judge on their asylum claims, and a systematic program designed to
deport them irrespective of the merits of their asylum claims.
Id. at 451 (citations omitted).
87. Id.
88. BELL, supra note 39.
89. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 678 F.2d 1023, 1039 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
90. Id. at 1041.
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guarantee, it is clear at least that agency deviation from its own
regulations and procedures may justify judicial relief in a case oth-
erwise properly before the court."
Having cleared the decks, the Fifth Circuit thus established a clear
field of fire. Its target was Judge King's "sweeping" and, according to the
court, unnecessary conclusions about the denial of equal protection:
The district court undertook to analyze an equal protection claim
upon appellees' contention that the Haitians were victims of unlaw-
ful discrimination on the basis of national origin. In view of our
conclusions announced above, a resolution of the issue is unneces-
sary. If there be an equal protection component to this situation it
would appear in the ad hoc action of INS officials in formulating
and implementing, on their own, a special plan altering what has
been provided by Congress and by regulation for all aliens seeking
asylum, the altered rights and duties being made applicable by the
INS only to aliens of a particular national origin while the lawfully
mandated procedures remain applicable to all other aliens seeking
asylum. We have found that these actions denied appellees at least
a valuable right- created by law- without due process, and we do
not address the equal protection contentions any more than to ob-
serve that we do not approve the sweeping conclusions of the dis-
trict court.
92
The Fifth Circuit's decision established the judicial template for
dealing with all future Haitian claims: deal with due process claims, if the
government's actions prove not to be immunized by the plenary power of
Congress and the executive branch to establish and execute immigration
policy, but reduce every equal protection claim or assertion of racial dis-
crimination to an unauthorized departure by lower-level immigration of-
ficials from neutral regulations. The capstone case, Jean v. Nelson,93 was
decided three years after the Fifth Circuit Haitian Refugee Center case.
Jean involved Haitians who had been apprehended before formally en-
tering the United States and, as the Immigration and Nationality Act
then read, were, therefore, subject to "exclusion" rather than "deporta-
tion."'94 Regulations permitted the indefinite incarceration of aliens
pending their exclusion hearings. Other regulations permitted certain
aliens to be paroled, that is, released from custody into the care of rela-
tives or others who would vouch for their appearances at exclusion pro-
ceedings. The Haitians filed suit, claiming that the government had sin-
gled them out for discriminatory treatment by denying them parole when
it was made available to others similarly situated. As had the plaintiffs
91. Id. at 1041 n.48.
92. Id. at 1041.
93. 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
94. Id. at 855.
95. See id. at 848.
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in the Haitian Refugee Center case, they brought an equal protection
challenge.
The Eleventh Circuit held, en banc, that the government had ple-
nary power to deal with exclusion and that this power extended to deny-
ing parole whenever it saw fit, unconstrained by any Fifth Amendment
limitations; it did remand to the district court, however, to determine
whether the INS had violated any of its own regulations.96 The Supreme
Court, in a decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, set aside the cir-
cuit court decision, not because the lower court decided the equal protec-
tion challenge wrongly but because it chose to address it at all:
We conclude that the Court of Appeals should not have reached
and decided the parole question on constitutional grounds, but we
affirm its judgment remanding the case to the District Court....
Had the court in Jean H followed [the] rule [of avoiding unneces-
sary constitutional construction], it would have addressed the issue
involving the immigration statutes and INS regulations first, instead
of after its discussion of the Constitution. Because the current stat-
utes and regulations provide petitioners with nondiscriminatory pa-
role consideration- which is all they seek to obtain by virtue of
their constitutional argument- there was no need to address the
constitutional issue.97
Justices Marshall and Brennan were the sole dissenters. Their ar-
gument was elegant and simple:
The Court's decision rests entirely on the premise that the parole
regulations promulgated during the course of this litigation pre-
clude INS officials from considering race and national origin in
making parole decisions. The Court then reasons that if petitioners
can show disparate treatment based on race or national origin,
these regulations would provide them with all the relief that they
seek. Thus, it sees no need to address the independent question
whether such disparate treatment would also violate the Constitu-
tion .... If the initial premise were correct, the Court's decision
would be sound. But because it is not, the remainder of the Court's
opinion simply collapses like a house of cards.... [A]n examination
of the regulations themselves, as well as the statutes and administra-
tive practices governing the parole of unadmitted aliens, indicates
that there are no nonconstitutional constraints on the Executive's
authority to make national-origin distinctions.98
96. The Supreme Court summarized the decision of the Eleventh Circuit:
The en banc Eleventh Circuit concluded that any such discrimination concerning parole would
not violate the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution because of the Government's
plenary authority to control the Nation's borders. That court remanded the case to the District
Court for consideration of petitioners' claim that their treatment violated INS regulations, which
did not authorize consideration of race or national origin in determining whether or not an ex-
cludable alien should be paroled.
Id. at 848.
97. Id. at 848, 854-55.
98. Id. at 858-59 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The majority based its decision on a reading of the key regulation
that permitted the grant of parole only under specified "neutral" circum-
stances.99 However, it conveniently omitted all reference to the regula-
tion's final paragraph, which gave the INS catch-all authority to grant pa-
role to "aliens whose continued detention is not in the public interest as
determined by the district director."'' Thus, INS officials retained full
authority to determine whether it was in the public interest to release
Haitian detainees or continue to hold them. Only an act of creative mis-
reading permitted the Court to avoid addressing a very simple ques-
tion-whether the Equal Protection Clause (as read into the Fifth
Amendment) prohibits racial discrimination in the enforcement of the
immigration laws. It is troubling that the question even has to be asked.
Rather than answering the question, Congress in 1996 apparently
deprived the courts of the opportunity to hear the sorts of claims raised
by the petitioners in the Haitian cases.1"' In the future, similar stories told
by the oppressed certainly will be overheard by academic researchers
and policy consultants. Those stories may even move the listeners to re-
consider their own racial attitudes. But it seems that they will not be
heard by the body vested by the Constitution and tradition with the
power to right legislative wrongs and stem executive abuse.
C. Historical Circumstance, Individual Choice, and the Legal
Background
A theme that emerges in much critical race scholarship is "choice." I
do not deny that it exists. But it seems clear that choices are always con-
strained by historical circumstance. Almost certainly, I would not have
been invited to contribute to this issue if I had not delivered a paper at
the Immigration Law Teachers' Workshop in 1998 that featured a panel
on race and immigration law. That panel was chaired by Kevin Johnson.
The title of my paper was Historical Development of U.S. Immigration
Law in the Colonial and Antebellum Periods. It probably ought to have
been titled Why the Irish Didn't Have to Become White: The Legal and
99. The new parole regulations track the two statutory standards for the granting of parole: "ur-
gent humanitarian reasons" or "significant public benefit." 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a) (1999). The regulations
first provide that "[t]he parole of... aliens who have serious medical conditions in which continued
detention would not be appropriate" would generally be justified by urgent humanitarian reasons. 8
C.F.R. § 212.5(a)(1). The regulations then define five groups that "would generally come within the
category of aliens for whom the granting of the parole exception would be 'strictly in the public inter-
est,' provided that the aliens present neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding." 8 C.F.R.
§ 212.5(a)(2). The first four groups are pregnant women, juveniles, certain aliens who have close rela-
tives in the United States, and aliens who will be witnesses in official proceedings in the United States.
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.5(a)(2)(i)-(iv); see also Jean, 472 U.S. at 860-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100. Jean, 472 U.S. at 860-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting the language of then-extant 8
C.F.R. § 212.5(a)(2)(v)).
101. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (Supp. IV. 1998) ("No court may set aside any action or decision by
the Attorney General regarding the detention or release of any alien.").
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Social Status of Irish Catholic Immigrants in America on the Eve of the
Great Migration.12
The paper took issue with the thesis Noel Ignatiev propounded in
How the Irish Became White."3 Ignatiev argued that although early nine-
teenth-century Irish migrants were attracted to the radically egalitarian
ideals of the French Revolution, and, more particularly, to the political
program of Daniel O'Connell, they quickly "sold out," renouncing aboli-
tionism and any hope for labor solidarity with free blacks in their desire
to get ahead." I believe Ignatiev credited O'Connell with more influence
than he actually had. However, what principally distinguished Ignatiev's
argument from that made by dozens of American historians since the
1950s was his discussion of motive. He argued that the Irish were not
simply competitors with blacks for scarce jobs and not simply occupants
of the very bottom rungs of the social ladder willing to climb over others
on the way up that ladder. Instead, the Irish were motivated to act be-
cause, in a fundamental, legal sense, they were not sure whether America
was going to assign them to the white or nonwhite side of the "color
line." Therefore, they had to demonstrate their "whiteness" by creating a
gulf between themselves and African Americans.'
My paper did not question the extent of racial prejudice among
early Irish immigrants. It did question Ignatiev's analysis of motives and
especially his conflation of legal and social racial categories. Thus, I ar-
gued that however debased their circumstances, antebellum Irish immi-
grants arrived in America with a status that was fundamentally different
from, and legally superior to, most (and after Dred Scott, all) blacks. The
Irish were clearly on the white side of the "color line," eligible for na-
tional citizenship and entitled to almost immediate political rights in
most states. They were also free from the legal disabilities imposed by
slavery and by state laws controlling the interstate movement of free
blacks.
Much of my argument centered on the legal status conferred by the
Naturalization Clause of the Constitution1" and its implementation in the
Naturalization Act of 1790.107 Ignatiev asserted:
The first Congress of the United States voted in 1790 that only
"white" persons could be naturalized as citizens. Coming as immi-
grants rather than as captives or hostages undoubtedly affected the
potential racial status of the Irish in America, but it did not settle
102. The workshop paper, delivered at Boalt Hall on May 30, 1988, was, in the main, a condensed
version of a paper with the second title, which I presented at a Southern Regional American Council
for Irish Studies meeting in Columbia, South Carolina, February 21, 1998. I quote liberally from that
paper in the pages that follow.
103. IGNATIEV, supra note 2.
104. See id. at 16-31.
105. See id.
106. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
107. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103.
No. 2]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
the issue, since it was by no means obvious who was "white." In the
early years Irish were frequently referred to as "niggers turned in-
side out"; the Negroes, for their part, were sometimes called
"smoked Irish," an appellation they must have found no more flat-
tering than it was intended to be.t"8
Ignatiev further claimed that the "Congress raised problems that
courts were wrestling with well into the twentieth century."10 9 On the ba-
sis of a limited number of authoritative texts,11° I concluded that there
was no uncertainty whatsoever that the Irish and indeed, all northern
European immigrants who followed them, were "white" within the
meaning of applicable law.
In making this argument, I did not suggest that the Irish in the pre-
famine years were not, in some sense, a "racialized" minority. Nor did I
suggest that racial categories are necessarily set in stone. Instead, I sug-
gested the opposite. Thus, for the reasons given above I accepted the ar-
gument that race is socially constructed. My concern was with the way
that it had been in fact constructed- and with the staying power and his-
torical authority of the structure once erected.
The argument I made then is one that I believe in even more
strongly now. Borrowing from Eric Williams and Fernand Braudel, it
links "voluntary" migration, "indentured servitude," and slavery to
European expansion into the New World.Ill The terms of the expansion
over the course of time created what- with all irony intended- can only
be called a "master race," in need of new recruits. In the beginning, most
Irish-but never all, because they were regarded as "barbaric" and dis-
loyal-were excluded. By the time of the American Revolution, how-
ever, they were grudgingly offered a seat at the table.!12
Thus, to a significant degree, European Americans have always en-
gaged in racial classifications, in which skin color-or some not entirely
108. IGNATIEV, supra note 2. at 41.
109. Id. at 41 n.26.
110. See TYLER ANBINDER, NATIVISM AND SLAVERY: NORTHERN KNOW-NOTHINGS AND THE
POLITICS OF THE 1850s 117-18 (1992); JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (photo.
reprint 1984) (1826); THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
111. See 3 FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE WORLD: CIVILIZATION AND
CAPITALISM, 15TH-18TH CENTURY 392-99 (Sign Reynolds trans., 1984)
The everlasting problem in th[e] boundless landscape was.., a shortage of manpower. For
emergent America required a supply of labour that was plentiful, easily controlled, cheap- ide-
ally costing nothing at all-in order to develop the new economy. Eric Williams's pioneering
study. Capitalism and Slavery, points repeatedly to the causal links between slavery, near-slavery,
serfdom, quasi-serfdom, wage-earning and quasi-wage-earning in the New World, and the rise of
capitalism in old Europe....
In fact one kind of servitude followed on the heels of another in the New World: the en-
slavement of the local Indian population led to its collapse; the servitude of white men (French
engags and English indentured servants) filled the gap for a while, especially in the West Indies
and the English mainland colonies; and black slavery eventually created a community with the
strength to put down roots and multiply, against all odds.
Id. at 392-93.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 120-29.
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convincing proxy, such as "blood lines"- has been used to justify oppres-
sion. The "assignment" of Africans and their descendants to the "black"
category was made by Europeans who maintained racial lines as an overt
justification for permanently subjugating more than eighty percent of all
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century migrants to America and the West
Indies and their progeny to chattel slavery. The percentage of "slaves"
brought to British mainland North America was considerably lower; in
all probability, however, it exceeded one-third of the total."3
The process of racial assignment goes back at least as far as the mid-
seventeenth century, when English colonists in America first began sys-
tematically to discriminate against the Africans in their midst. Here, I
quote Michael Zuckerman:
Whereas settlers of the other European nations in the New
World apprehended color categories in continua that reflected ra-
cial interbreeding, the English who colonized America acknowl-
edged only the polarized alternatives of white and black. Whereas
Spaniards and Portuguese evolved elaborate vocabularies that rec-
ognized the complexity of racial realities, Virginians and Carolini-
ans put themselves racially apart from their slaves. Drawing a di-
chotomous color line between themselves and the Africans that
denied all gradation or degree, they defied the abundant actuality
of miscegenation and the evidence of the varied complexions before
their eyes."4
Winthrop Jordan has given us a thorough and convincing account of
how Europeans- and more particularly, the English- upon first encoun-
tering Africans, were struck by their color;115 exaggerated the difference
between it and their own by calling it "black" and theirs "white;" and de-
veloped a complex system of subordination that depended, in large
113. Few Spaniards or Portuguese migrated to the New World. Their numbers were dwarfed by
imported black slaves. Between 1630 and 1780, some 815,000 Europeans and 2,339,000 Africans were
brought to the British settlements in the West Indies and on the North American mainland. Fewer
than 650,000 of these Europeans settled on the mainland. In all probability, some 362,000 African and
West Indian slaves were brought to the mainland between 1630 and 1780. See DAVID W. GALENSON,
WHITE SERVITUDE IN COLONIAL AMERICA: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 218 tbl.H4 (1981): Philip D.
Morgan, British Encounters with Africans and African Americans, Circa 1600-1780, in STRANGERS
WITHIN THE REALM: THE CULTURAL MARGINS OF THE FIRST BRITISH EMPIRE, supra note 46, at 162
tbl.1; WITHOUT CONSENT OR CONTRACT: THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 55 (Robert
W. Fogel et al. eds., 1992).
114. Michael Zuckerman, Identity in British America: Unease in Eden, in COLONIAL IDENTITY IN
THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1500-1800, at 115, 150 (Nicholas Canny & Anthony Padgen eds., 1994).
Zuckerman notes:
[tihere was, to be sure, a more elaborate and complex set of color categories in the British West
Indies than in the British colonies on the mainland. But this is, in the exact sense of the phrase,
the exception that proves the rule, since even in the British Islands the intermediate categories
were less elaborately and more grudgingly applied than in the French, Spanish, and Portuguese
colonies.
Id. at 150 n.101.
115. Obviously, the Africans that Europeans encountered had a wide range of skin tones. These
differences were sometimes noted, but, as Zuckerman suggests, they ordinarily had no effect in defin-
ing the underlying legal or social relationships between the English and the Africans. See id. at 150.
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measure, on the assumed natural superiority of "white" over "black" in
virtually every realm: physical beauty, intellectual capacity, spiritual de-
velopment, and sexual self-control. 16 All of this contributed to:
"a growing racialist conviction that negroes were a non-human form
of life." A pious woman of early Barbados maintained that "any
minister who dared to baptise them might as well baptise a puppy."
Another insisted that blacks "were beasts, and had no more souls
than beasts." And in the Chesapeake and Carolinas, more than one
planter actually named his Africans Ape or Monkey.1 7
This attitude also provided a strong set of justifications for chattel
or bond slavery among those who established that institution and stood
to gain from it. Those gains promised to be considerable. For, as Jordan
argues, virtually from the beginning,
[a]t law... 'bond slavery' implied utter deprivation of liberty.
... Slavery was also thought of as a perpetual condition. While it
had not yet come invariably to mean lifetime labor, it was fre-
quently thought of in those terms. Except sometimes in instances of
punishment for crime, slavery was open ended; in contrast to servi-
tude, it did not involve a definite term of years. Slavery was perpet-
ual also in the sense that it was often thought of as hereditary. It
was these dual aspects of perpetuity which were to assume such im-
portance in America."8
By 1636, the legal basis for perpetual slavery had been established
in Barbados." 9 Over the next seventy years, all of the British possessions
in the Caribbean and on the southern mainland- as well as most north-
ern jurisdictions- adopted the same rule. Special regulations governing
the treatment of blacks (or, perhaps more commonly, of "Blacks, Indi-
ans, and Mulattos") were detailed in "black codes," which, although not
as elaborate as their nineteenth-century counterparts, still regulated a
wide range of activities, including the punishment, entertainment, and
manumission of slaves, as well as the regulation of their commercial
transactions, weapons possession, travel, and legal competency. 12°
The development of a special body of slave law went hand-in-hand
with the development of laws intended to establish the legal status and
116. See generally JORDAN, supra note 48, at 3-43.
117. Zuckerman, supra note 114, at 150.
118. JORDAN, supra note 48, at 53-54.
119. See STANLEY M. ELKINS, SLAVERY: A PROBLEM IN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONAL AND
INTELLECTUAL LIFE 41 n.19 (1959).
[B]y 1636, Negroes were already coming into Barbados in great enough numbers that the gover-
nor's council felt it necessary in that year, law or no law, to issue a regulation declaring that all
Negroes or Indians landed on the island would be considered as slaves, bound to work there for
the rest of their lives. Even in the Spanish colonies, lifetime servitude had been familiar for nearly
a century.
Id. (citations omitted).
120. For a typical statute dealing with virtually all these matters, see Act of Dec. 12, 1712, 1 Colo-
nial Laws of N.Y. 161, entitled "An Act for Preventing, Suppressing and Punishing the Conspiracy and
Insurrection of Negroes and other Slaves."
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permissible treatment of European servants. Until the 1650s in Barba-
dos, the 1680s in the Chesapeake, approximately 1700 in the Carolinas,
and approximately 1760 in Georgia, the bulk of the labor force consisted
of servants brought to America and required to serve for a term of years
before being granted their "freedom. '121 These servants remained the
largest segment of the labor force in the middle colonies until the end of
the colonial period. Often, we refer to such laborers as indentured ser-
vants; such a characterization, with its implicit emphasis on a signed pa-
per recording an understanding between an intending employer and in-
tending employee, treats such servitude as something freely chosen,
voluntary in the fullest sense of the word.22
This understanding captures part of the reality of seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century labor history. Particularly in the eighteenth century,
and particularly for especially "desirable" migrants, such as Irish Presby-
terians, a relatively "free" market for servants existed, and intending
immigrants could bargain over the terms and length of their employ-
ment.123 Yet particularly in the seventeenth century, many of the Europe-
ans who came to America as servants came without indentures of any
kind. There simply is no evidence that most agreed to, or even under-
stood, the terms of their servitude before departing. There is, however,
ample evidence that a substantial percentage of those brought to Amer-
ica were brought against their will, either as convicts, victims of kidnap-
pers, or political prisoners. As best we can tell, nearly 400,000 people mi-
grated from the so-called British Isles to America and the West Indies
during the seventeenth century. 124 At least twenty percent were co-
erced.125 Of the 400,000, more than a quarter likely were Irish.126 Virtually
all- a point that deserves special emphasis- were Catholics. The rate of
coercion for this subgroup was substantially higher, probably exceeding
fifty percent. 27
The shortage of the white laborers desirable to employers, coupled
with the decline of coerced white migration in the eighteenth century,
meant that employers and politicians had to offer more incentives if they
were to continue to attract white settlers. Migrants from Ireland did not
121. See GALENSON, supra note 113, at 118-26.
122. See, e.g., id. at 3 ("[M]any Europeans were enabled to emigrate to the New World by enter-
ing contracts of servitude called indentures." (emphasis added)).
123. See Farley Grubb, The Auction of Redemptioner Servants, Philadelphia, 1771-1804: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 48 J. ECON. HIST. 583 (1988). Grubb indicates that "Ulster Irish were able to negoti-
ate 23 percent shorter contracts than Irish redemptioners from Dublin." Id. at 602 n.36.
124. See KERBY A. MILLER, EMIGRANTS AND EXILES 137 (1985).
125. See id. at 143-44.
126. See id. at 137. Miller, after noting that "emigration records are so incomplete that it is possi-
ble to achieve only the roughest estimates of numbers," indicates that, "[a]t best, we can guess that
perhaps 50[,000]-100,000 Irish left Ireland [for America] in the 1600s." Id. For reasons that I give in an
unpublished paper, I believe that the seventeenth-century number must exceed 100,000. See John A.
Scanlan, The "Great" Catholic Migration, 1620-1775: Motive, Opportunity, Policy, and Failure (un-
published manuscript, on file with the University of Illinois Law Review).
127. See MILLER, supra note 124, at 143-44.
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pose a problem per se; the most desirable servants of all were the so-
called Scotch-Irish, generally -although not exclusively -Presbyterians
from the northern province of Ulster who were almost indistinguishable
physically from the "native Irish," their southern Catholic counter-
parts. 128 "Passing" was almost certainly easy- and commonplace. Never-
theless, fears of Catholic disloyalty and religious prejudice promoted
specifically anti-Catholic legislation in a number of colonies. In 1716, for
example, South Carolina enacted a measure somewhat misleadingly enti-
tled, "An act to encourage the importation of white servants into this
Province.' 1 29 Its preamble noted that "there hath been imported into this
Province several native Irish servants that are Papists."'3° In response, it
obliged:
all merchants or masters of vessels or others shall upon their oaths
declare that to the best of their knowledge none of the servants by
them imported be either what is commonly called native Irish, or
persons of known scandalous character, or Roman Catholics. And if
any merchant ... shall ship any servants to this Province, he shall be
obliged to send a certificate that such persons or servants are Prot-
estants.., and with such a certificate, Irish servants, being Protes-
tants, may be lawfully imported here.'3 '
The heavy concentration of Protestants among the Irish who arrived
in America after 1700 was not accidental. Nor was it attributable to spe-
cial hardships that Protestants faced in Ireland. Virtually every colony-
and, on occasion, the British authorities - made conscious decisions in
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries to encourage Protes-
tant immigration and discourage Catholic immigration.3 2 These policies
were specifically and overtly religious.'33
128. See id. at 160-67.
129. FRANCIS X. CURRAN, CATHOLICS IN COLONIAL LAW 91 (1963) (quoting 2 THOMAS COOPER
& D.J. MCCORD, STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 646-49 (Research Pubs., 1974) (1836-
41)).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 1 offer a detailed account of restrictions on Catholic migration to colonial America in two
unpublished papers. The first, Political Boundaries, Economic Growth, and Religious Exclusion: Im-
migration Policy, Law, and State Formation in Colonial America, was delivered at the Institute of In-
ternational Law, Kiel University, Federal Republic of Germany, on June 18, 1991, and was substan-
tially revised in 1995-96. It details specific provisions in the 1609 Virginia Charter effectively
prohibiting the settlement of Catholics and subsequent anti-Catholic legislation in Maryland, Virginia,
and the West Indies dating back to the 1620s and 1630s. Similar restrictions were adopted in "[t]he
basic charters of all the New England colonies, except Rhode Island." Arthur J. Riley, Catholicism in
New England to 1788, at 237 (1936) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, American University). The paper
also details specific measures adopted to curb Catholic immigration to Maryland, Massachusetts, New
York, and even Pennsylvania in the last decades of the seventeenth century and the first decades of
the eighteenth.
The second paper, The "Great" Catholic Migration, 1620-1775: Motive, Opportunity, Policy, and
Failure, was delivered on September 27, 1997, at "The Scattering" Conference inaugurating the Irish
Centre for Migration Studies at University College Cork, Republic of Ireland. It chronicles dozens of
anti-Irish measures enacted in the West Indies, mainland North America, and Newfoundland during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Most of these measures were explicitly or implicitly directed
[Vol. 2000
CALL AND RESPONSE
Because religion in the end predominated over race and religious
toleration in eighteenth-century America outsped racial toleration, the
barriers to Irish Catholic migration began to break down rapidly in the
last decades of the century. In the end, the Irish were aided by four
things:
First, Africans and their offspring, virtually from the moment that
the English first encountered them, universally were characterized as
"black." This designation was reserved to them exclusively, just as "red"
was a designation reserved in America for native tribes, the so-called In-
dians. Almost from the beginning of European settlement, "black-
ness"- and to a lesser extent, "redness"- provided a justification for
subjecting Africans, Indians, and their progeny to perpetual or bond
slavery, a status never imposed on any English, Irish, Scotch, or Euro-
pean servant.
Second, largely for the reason explained above, by the early nine-
teenth century, it was apparent to nearly everyone-citizens and immi-
grants, slave holders and slaves, "nativist" politicians and the Irish them-
selves- that the Irish already were "white" and that they had been for a
long time.
Third, after 1790 Irish "whiteness" entitled all Irish to national "citi-
zenship"- a benefit that blacks were not able to claim until after the
Civil War. This privilege was not nearly as provisional or tenuous as Ig-
natiev implies. Within the political framework of the early nineteenth
century, it was not revocable. It ensured continuing large-scale migration
from Ireland, including increased migration from the Catholic south.
Fourth, the enactment of the First Amendment in 1791 prohibited
an alternative, religiously specific ground for barring Irish Catholic mi-
grants from "national" citizenship or curtailing their immigration. The
amendment, however, did not guarantee that all Irish immediately would
be granted full political or social rights at the local level. In the struggle
for those rights, Irish Catholics constituted a distinct and distinctly disfa-
vored class. Racial or ethnic prejudice rendered Irish assimilation diffi-
cult, but after the American Revolution, those difficulties were confined
almost exclusively to Catholic immigrants and their offspring. Religion,
not race, rendered Irish Catholic assimilation difficult, often pitting
Catholics against intensely bigoted Protestants- some of whom, like
Theodore Parker, were also abolitionists.
In their new status as tolerated but unwelcome immigrants, the Irish
Catholics who poured into the United States before the Civil War had
at Irish Catholics (commonly referred to as "papists"), rather than at their Presbyterian, Anglican, or
Quaker counterparts.
133. Additional regulations were promulgated in virtually every colony attempting to obstruct the
landing of paupers and convicts. Generally, these laws were facially neutral, since they applied equally
to Protestants and Catholics. Such legislation undoubtedly garnered additional support, however, be-
cause a disproportionate percentage of the impoverished and those arriving under sentence of trans-
portation were identified as Irish Catholics.
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every incentive to look down on the faces at the bottom of the well. And,
as Ignatiev demonstrates, they clearly did just that.I34 Yet their struggle
for status and economic security was more complicated than Ignatiev
imagines. Unlike those they looked down upon, the Irish Catholics had a
toehold on a ladder fashioned from the Naturalization Act of 1790I1" and
the First Amendment. The role they played in depriving free blacks of
opportunity was substantial but probably less important than Ignatiev
implies. Long before the Irish Catholics were a significant political force,
white politicians of every stripe were closing doors to blacks. Even dur-
ing the immediate antebellum era, Republicans were insisting that aboli-
tion would not bring full social equality.136 The Civil War may have been
fought to abolish slavery, but only a romantic would argue that it was
fought to abolish racism.
The moral: it is appropriate to look critically at any group that se-
cures privilege at the expense of another. But it is likely more worthwhile
to look at the historical circumstances, the economic assumptions, and
the institutions that always have informed the choices that people, indi-
vidually and together, make.
134. See IGNATIEV, supra note 2.
135. The Naturalization Act of 1970, 1 Stat. 103.
136. In the first Lincoln-Douglas debate, conducted in Springfield, Illinois, on August 21, 1858,
Stephen Douglas:
charged Lincoln with believing that the Negro was endowed with equality.., and that no human
law could deprive him of rights conferred "by the Supreme Ruler of the universe." "Now,"
Douglas added, "I do not believe that the Almighty ever intended the negro to be the equal of
the white man. If he did, he has been a long time demonstrating the fact."
J.R. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 148 (1978) (quoting CREATED
EQUAL? THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, at 111-12 (Paul M. Angle ed., 1958).
Lincoln responded,
"I agree with Judge Douglas that he [African Americans] is not my equal in many respects - cer-
tainly not in color, perhaps not in moral and intellectual endowment. But in the right to eat the
bread, without leave of anybody else, which his own hand earns, he is my equal and the equal of
Judge Douglas, and the equal of every living man."
Id. at 149.
In the same speech, Lincoln insisted: "I have no purpose to introduce political and social equality
between the white and black races." Id. According to Pole, "elsewhere [Lincoln] denied that Negroes
ought to be allowed to vote or to serve on juries." Id These contradictory attitudes were not unique:
Douglas did not approve of slavery and did not want to deprive Negroes of the ability to earn
their own living; neither of the antagonists proposed to place in the Negro's hands the political or
even the civil powers that were needed to protect his admitted right to economic independence.
The difficulties and inconsistencies in Lincoln's position were at least as serious as those which he
successfully exposed in Douglas during the further course of the debates. He plainly held that
equality in the rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence could be guaranteed with-
out conferring the rights normally connected with citizenship. His aim was to change attitudes but
not institutions. The immense popular success of his own campaign which, though he lost the
senatorial election, raised him to the national position from which he won the presidency two
years later, should not obscure the fact that Lincoln was asserting incompatible principles. That,
indeed, was part of the very reason for his success; the problem facing the numerous Republican
supporters who wanted to see the Negroes free, who wanted them to support themselves in peace
and safety, and who wanted the institutions of the country to ensure these things, but did not
want to share those institutions with the African race, was extremely complex and had not yet
been fully explored.
Id. at 149-50.
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VII. CONCLUSION: THE LEGAL ACADEMY AND THE COMMITMENT TO
CHANGE
Kevin Johnson asserts that:
Many, perhaps most, immigration law scholars are sympathetic to
the rights of immigrants and frequently criticize immigration doc-
trine in a way that generally could be classified as "pro-immigrant."
The white, liberal immigration law scholars, however, often do not
fully acknowledge the racial influences or impact of the immigra-
tion laws .... 137
Much of these scholars' work, Johnson claims, "is abstract, distant
from the impact on the lives of people affected by the operation of the
law. Juiceless analysis of 'the law' ... fails to capture the law's true effect
on people's lives.""13 Because these scholars are so wedded to "viewing
abstract legal principles without a concrete, real-life appreciation of how
they actually operate in practice," they tend to ignore or dismiss "the
thrust of the race-immigration scholarship.' '1 39
This may be true. But I believe the argument understates the nature
of the "sympathy"- and commitment- displayed by many, perhaps
most "white, liberal immigration law scholars," most of whom are mem-
bers of law school faculties belonging to several overlapping communi-
ties.
First, virtually all are lawyers. Many have joined law school faculties
after years of private or governmental practice, where they often dealt
with immigration matters. Others began teaching without extensive prac-
tical experience. Whatever their background, most possess J.D. degrees.
As importantly, I am fairly certain that most faculty members teaching
immigration law maintain their licenses to practice law and continue to
represent clients. Many are actively involved with clinics, others do
regular or occasional pro bono work, and a few maintain a private prac-
tice.
While some of these faculty members have offered legal advice to,
or even represented, the INS, the State Department, or other govern-
mental agencies, most have not. Instead, their legal work generally has
been on behalf of aliens: typically, asylum seekers, political activists, stu-
dents seeking the opportunity to remain in the United States, battered
women, and those facing detention and probable removal because of al-
leged misconduct. Occasionally, they assist the UNHCR and voluntary
agencies in the courts. More frequently, they accompany individuals to
INS interviews, sit for long hours in dirty waiting rooms, and argue with
clerks about missing papers or scheduling foul-ups. Or they represent
their clients in hearings before immigration judges, mindful that if they
137. Johnson, supra note 11, at 550.
138. Id. at 551.
139. Id. at 550.
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lose, those clients will be ordered out of the country with virtually no
hope of obtaining a permanent reprieve from the courts. In those hear-
ings, I am certain that they rely heavily- as they should- on "legal doc-
trine" and that many avoid history and social theory altogether. This
practice of immigration law is about as far from the conventional notion
of the ivory tower as I can imagine.
Second, as academics, all teach. Certainly, much of that teaching
comes from the casebooks (or perhaps more properly, the single case-
book)"4 to which Kevin Johnson objects because of failure to address
Critical Race Theory directly enough or to quote extensively from its
scholarship. But even those casebooks (if the plural is proper) raise is-
sues about the Haitian cases and Haitian interdiction, the Chinese Exclu-
sion Laws, 4' the National Origins Quota System and its demise, 42 and
the troubling issue of "closed borders" in a world sharply divided be-
tween the haves and the have nots. Time constraints probably preclude
massive outside reading, but I am certain that works by John Higham,
Ronald Takaki, and Roger Daniels make their way into many class-
rooms. As importantly, I am certain that many classes make their way
into immigration courts and client waiting rooms and that the experience
helps convince students that people "of color" are especially disadvan-
taged by the system.
Third, as academics, all write. I detect far less legal doctrine in my
colleagues' work than Kevin Johnson does. I detect far more interest in
policy. I would like to see more articles addressing the racial dimensions
of that policy. But I have no quarrel with those who prefer to focus on
gender issues, poverty issues, free speech issues, or even on the meaning
of "citizenship" or the justification of border controls. Ours is a big boat.
Further, I believe that some of the finest immigration scholars not (to my
knowledge) directly involved with, or perhaps even overly sympathetic
with, Critical Race Theory, have written perceptively about the role that
race has played in our nation's distant or recent history. Certainly, Ken-
neth Karst comes to mind,'43 but so do Linda Bosniak,1" Gerald Neu-
mann,145 and Michael Scaperlanda.46
140. The textbook referred to is ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 76.
141. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
142. The National Origins Quota System was eliminated by the Immigration Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (1994)).
143. See KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1989).
144. See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047 (1994).
145. See Gerald L. Neumann, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991).
146. See Michael Scaperlanda, The Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights of Aliens: To What Extent
Do They Survive United States v. Verduzco-Urquidez?, 56 MO. L. REV. 213 (1991); Michael Scaper-
landa, Who Is My Neighbor?: An Essay on Immigrants, Welfare Reform, and the Constitution, 29
CONN. L. REV. 1587 (1997).
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Race matters. Critical Race Theory matters. Legal doctrine matters,
and so does public policy. What matters most in the academy, though, is
that we speak to each other, listen, and come away enriched. The satis-
faction we gain from such conversations, conducted out loud or in the
law reviews, will help sustain us as we greet the new millennium and con-
front American racism entering its fifth century.
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